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ABSTRACT
Scholars and practitioners frustrated by the inefficiencies of
environmentalpolicy and the excessive adversarialismof environmental politics have embraced a panoply of "next generation"
reforms of policy and process. Reformers hope thatemerging policies
can be more pragmaticand efficient than those shaped by the laws
of the 1960s and 1970s, and that policymaking processes will be
more collaborativeand less conflictual. There has been movement
down the collaborative path in many areas, from habitat
conservationplanningunder the EndangeredSpecies Act to formal
and informal attempts at negotiatingpollution regulations to local
collaborativeconservation efforts like the Quivira Coalition. This
articleacknowledges the depth of the problem of adversarialismin
the current environmental policymaking system as well as the
potential of some of these collaborativeapproaches, but argues that
this strainof the next generationagenda is in important respects a
return to an old and discreditedform of the "policy without law"
decried by Theodore Lowi in his classic The End of Liberalism in
the 1960s and attacked by those who built the modern structureof
environmental law.
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I. INTRODUCTION: A COLLABORATIVE REGIME IN
ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY MAKING?
Most students of U.S. environmental regulation would agree that
the legislative explosion of the 1960s and 1970s was triggered by
enthusiasm for the cause of environmental protection unchained from the
practical challenges of policy implementation. Statutory commands such as
those to eliminate water pollution or ignore economic costs in species
protection easily passed the Congress but quickly met intense political
resistance and ground against economic and technological realities. Just as
quickly, the difficulties of risk assessment and measuring the benefits and
costs of regulation generated fundamental conflict over exactly what the
Congress had committed the nation to in its eager embrace of
environmentalism.1
The first generation of environmental laws triggered a profound
expansion of government power in the service of emergent values and
newly powerful interests. The green state - the set of laws, institutions, and
expectations dealing with conservation and environmental policy that has
been established over the last hundred years -became a focal point for
political struggles as the larger political system attempted to come to grips
with the laws' enormous economic and social effects. Scholars have noted
a loose consensus on the need for strong environmental protections, but
environmental issues have divided the Congress, and the regulatory
process has been marked by partisan maneuvering and frequent resorts to
litigation by frustrated groups.2
Many studies have criticized the efficiency and effectiveness of the
environmental statutes passed in the 1970s, and these critiques have
underpinned both a conservative assault on the green state and the
proposals for reform that have emerged from the so-called "next
generation" school.3 The "next generation" of environmental policy making

1. See generally DANIEL A. FARBER, EcO-PRAGMATISM: MAKING SENSIBLE ENVIRONMENTAL
DECISIONS IN AN UNCERTAIN WORLD (1999) (discussing complexities flowing from risk
assessment).
2. This article's argument is part of a larger project focused on the state of modern
environmental policy making. For a variety of reasons, Congress has been gridlocked on
environmental policy since 1990. But this congressional gridlock has not led to policy gridlock.
Rather, policy making has moved onto a series of other pathways: appropriations and budget
politics, executive politics, judicial politics, the states' involvement, and -the topic of this
article-collaboration. See KLYZA & SOUSA, supra note *.
3. See ACROSS THE GREAT DIVIDE: EXPLORATIONS IN COLLABORATIVE CONSERVATION AND
THE AMEIUCAN WEST (Philip Brick et al. eds., 2001) [hereinafter ACROSS THE GREAT DIVIDE];
RONALD D. BRUNNER ET AL., FINDING COMMON GROUND: GOVERNANCE AND NATURAL

RESOURCES IN THE AMERICAN WEST (2002); ENVIRONMENTAL GOVERNANCE: A REPORT ON THE
NEXT GENERATION OF ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY (Donald F. Kettl ed., 2002); ENVIRONMENTAL
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seeks to give greater priority to economic efficiency, pragmatically balance
interests, and allow for greater collaboration between government and
regulated interests. Yet with very few exceptions, e.g., the Clean Air Act
Amendments that created the SO 2 allowance trading program and habitat
conservation planning under the Endangered Species Act, the Congress has
been unable to respond to sharp critiques of the basic environmental
statutes with new laws that would guide the reconstruction of
environmental policy making. Instead, policy makers have groped toward
"next generation" policies, with "compromises to resolve emerging
problems.. .jury-rigged around and within the existing labyrinth of rules."4
II. COLLABORATION AS A RESPONSE TO PROBLEMS IN THE
GREEN STATE
While Congress has been unable to guide the reconstruction of
environmental policy making with new statutes, policy makers and scholars
have embraced new tools like economic incentives, reflecting movement
toward what Marc Eisner called an "efficiency regime" in regulatory
affairs.5 Another movement, the subject of this article, involves the embrace
of new processes aimed at involving interested groups more directly in
decision making. Standard administrative procedures for public
involvement and the environmental laws' invitation to citizen litigation
have been deemed inadequate and even counterproductive; reformers have
embraced collaborative approaches that they expect will mitigate conflict
and lead to more effective, efficient, and flexible policy choices. Negotiated
regulation, less formal "reinvention" projects like President Clinton's
Common Sense Initiative and Project XL, habitat conservation planning,
collaborative conservation, and "backyard environmentalism" share the
goals of managing conflict and addressing endemic inefficiencies by
"bringing society back in" to the policymaking process.6
Collaboration has gained a foothold and generated enthusiasm in
part because it flows from the conventional critique of command-andcontrol policy making and in part because it has served a range of political

(Robert F. Durant et
al. eds., 2004); MARY GRAHAM, THE MORNING AFTER EARTH DAY: PRACTICAL ENVIRONMENTAL

GOVERNANCE RECONSIDERED: CHALLENGES, CHOICES, AND OPPORTUNITIES

POLITICS (1999); THINKING ECOLOGICALLY: THE NEXr GENERATION OF ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY
(Marian R. Chertow & Daniel C. Esty eds., 1997); EDWARD P. WEBER, BRINGING SOCIETY BACK
IN: GRASSROOTS ECOSYSTEM MANAGEMENT, ACCOUNTABILITY, AND SUSTAINABLE COMMUNITIES
(2003) [hereinafter WEBER, SOCIETY]; EDWARD P. WEBER, PLURALISM BY THE RULES (1998)
[hereinafter WEBER, PLURALISM].

4.

GRAHAM, supra note 3, at 112.

5.

MARC ALLEN EISNER, REGULATORY POLITICS IN TRANSITION 170-201 (2d ed. 2000).

6.

See WEBER, SOCIETY, supra note 3.
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interests. President Clinton hoped that his participatory reinvention
initiatives would demonstrate the flexibility of beleaguered institutions,
thereby fending off crippling attacks on the green state from a hostile
Congress. On the other side, the failure of conservative broadsides against
the green state in the 104th Congress demonstrated to some business and
conservative interests the futility of these attacks. Some saw negotiated
regulation and collaboration as attractive alternatives that might take the
confrontational edge off the laws adopted in the 1960s and early 1970s and
yield more flexible, less costly regulations. At the local level, communities
badly divided by environmental conflicts and suffering economic
disruptions from new approaches to resource management embraced
collaborative conservation models; the movement toward collaborative
conservation opened the possibility of shifting the balance of power in
disputes over public lands.7 Thus, many scholars working in many different
areas of environmental policy have studied attempts to renegotiate relations
between public authority and private interests defined in the basic
environmental laws and some see the halting development of a
collaborative pathway in environmental regulation.
This development raises several crucial questions for policy and
democratic politics and has therefore been quite controversial. First,
substantial parts of the new agenda test the limits of environmental
laws-one critic noted of Clinton's collaborative Project XL, "If it isn't
illegal, it isn't XL." 8 The use of administrative action and informal
negotiations with affected interests to stretch uncomfortable legal
constraints is a serious attack on key premises of the new social regulation,
and it is notable that in some cases this is the ultimate "policy without
law" -the making of an entirely new approach to regulation and natural
resources policy without statutory guidance.
A second, related problem is whether this collaborative approach
can create workable and generally satisfying policy choices. For example,
if a collaborative group agrees to a proposal for forest management, what
is to prevent parties that disagree with the agreement from seeking to block
the proposal under a host of laws- the Administrative Procedure Act, 9 the
Endangered Species Act,' ° the National Environmental Policy Act," and the

7. See WEBER, PLURALISM, supranote 3, at 30-69. See generally AcROSS THE GREAT DIVIDE,
supra note 3; BRUNNER ET AL., supra note 3.
8. Rena I. Steinzor, Reinventing Environmental Regulation: The Dangerous Journey from
Command to Self-Control, 22 HARv. ENVrL. L. REv. 103, 147 (1998) (quoting an unknown
Environmental Protection Agency staff member).
9. Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 500-551,551-559,701-706,1305,3105, 3344,
4301, 5335, 5372, 7521 (2000).
10. Endangered Species Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1544 (2000).
11. National Environmental Policy Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4370 (2000).
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National Forest Management Act 12 for starters? To put it another way, can
without clearing away the multiple
the collaborative pathway truly flourish
3
layers of the existing green state?'
Third, the application of collaborative regulation to resource
management raises important accountability problems. How can we ensure
that negotiated arrangements are consistent with the public interest?
Edward Weber, a strong advocate for collaboration, focused on the
accountability problem confronting collaborative conservation groups and
14
argued that well-designed processes can produce accountability.
Contrarily, Theodore Lowi looks at the new collaborationism skeptically.
In his classic The End of Liberalism,published in the 1960s, Lowi attacked the
handover of public authority to private interests in the New Deal regulatory
system and found the core of the problem in statutory language that
provided little guidance to administrative agencies (thus creating ample
opportunity for negotiation over statutory interpretation)." Lowi decried
a "public philosophy" he termed "interest group liberalism," which erased
the distinction between public authority and private interests and allowed
private interests to use public power to achieve their own purposes. 6 These
ideas were central to the critique of captured regulatory policy making in
the 1960s and 1970s and shaped the more adversarial approach to
regulation laid down in the environmental statutes adopted at that time.
Yet here we are again. In attacking more recent arguments for localism and
flexibility in environmental regulation, or so-called "backyard
environmentalism," Lowi wrote, "This is where I came in 35 years ago in
my confrontation with the late New Deal policies.... [T]he motivation is the
Again,
same -to try to finesse the coercive nature of public authority ....
pretend away public authority."18 Frustration with excessive adversarialism
has pushed policy making down an old and well-beaten path, one that
policy makers in the 1970s thought they had closed off with statutory
mandates that are now widely viewed as far too inflexible. The result is an
effort to reconstruct what Lowi called "policy without law" in a context in
which these efforts will always be highly contentious and open to challenge
in the courts.

National Forest Management Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1600-1687 (2000).
See GRAHAM, supra note 3.
See generally WEBER, SOCIETY, supra note 3.
15. THEODORE J. LowI, THE END OF LIBERALISM 92-107 (2d ed. 1979).
16. Id. at 42-63.
17. EISNER, supra note 5, at 126-27.
18. Theodore J. Lowi, Frontyard Propaganda: A Response to "Beyond Backyard
Environmentalism," BOSTON REV., Oct.-Nov. 1999, available at http://bostonreview.net/
BR24.5/contents.html (last visited Mar. 6, 2007).
12.
13.
14.
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This article explores three areas in which policy makers have
sought to integrate private interests in the policymaking process in new
(and, as it turns out, old) ways. In the 1990s, habitat conservation planning
(HCPs) under the Endangered Species Act (ESA) became a crucial part of
the Clinton administration's endangered species program. Congress opened
the possibility for HCPs in 1982; the Clinton administration pushed the
development of the program hard, and in directions not anticipated in the
statute. We will review the evolution of habitat conservation planning and
briefly focus on the multi-species plan submitted by the Plum Creek Timber
Company for management of lands in Washington State. Second, in the
regulatory process we have seen movement from formal negotiated
regulation under the Negotiated Rulemaking Act of 1990 to more flexible,
even extra-legal participatory "reinvention" efforts, to a growing interest in
voluntary programs. That section will trace the evolution from more to less
formal processes, focusing on the Clinton era reinvention initiatives. Third,
through the 1990s, local "collaborative conservation" efforts focusing on the
management of natural resources proliferated and gathered considerable
attention from scholars and policy makers. This article will look briefly at
the collaborative conservation movement and will then compare the work
of two groups, California's well-known Quincy Library Group and the
Quivira Coalition in New Mexico, in an effort to discern both the potential
and the limitations of this emerging pathway for making environmental
policy. The conclusion will explore the implications of the movement
toward collaboration and negotiation for the green state, and the constraints
that settled institutions and the politics of multiple orders place on the
possibilities for this emerging pathway.
III. HABITAT CONSERVATION PLANNING: COLLABORATION
THROUGH THE ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT
In the rare cases in which it has been aggressively implemented, the
ESA has proven to be an extremely powerful law. From the Tellico Dam in
Tennessee to the forests and rivers of the Pacific Northwest, the law has
driven significant changes in the practices of federal agencies and has
disrupted settled patterns of resource exploitation on public lands.
Importantly, the ESA also threatens private property rights. Threatened and
endangered species often live on private lands, and the ESA - understood
to prohibit all "harms" to listed species, including damage to species
habitat- may make many otherwise legitimate development activities
illegal. From the beginning, this was, of course, a source of considerable
concern to large and small landowners alike.
In 1982, Congress amended the law to offer relief to those faced
with the possibility of ESA-based limits on the use of their private lands.
The conference report declared that the ESA's new section 10 would give
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the Secretary of the Interior "more flexibility in regulating the incidental
take of endangered and threatened species" and would address "the
concerns of private landowners who are faced with having otherwise lawful
actions not requiring federal permits prevented by Section 9 prohibitions
against taking." 9 The amendment offered non-federal landowners a way
around the absolute ban on actions that would damage species habitat and
do "harm" to members of listed species. They could negotiate a relaxation
of the ESA's "take" prohibition with the Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS) or
National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS).2 °
The amendment created a process by which non-federal
landowners could gain "incidental take permits" (ITPs) that would allow
them to alter habitat despite the possibility of harm to listed species. To
receive a permit, a landowner must submit a "habitat conservation plan"
estimating the impact of development activities on listed species and
showing how the impact of those activities will be minimized and
mitigated.2 The Secretary of the Interior has authority to issue an ITP if she
finds that the HCP will, "to the maximum extent practicable," mitigate the
take, and if the resulting harm "will not appreciably reduce the likelihood
of the survival and recovery of the species in the wild." 22 HCPs vary in size
and scope, from plans submitted by owners of small lots dealing with one
species to comprehensive plans covering hundreds of thousands of acres
and many species.
While section 10 had roots in landowners' concerns about property
rights, there was also a sense in the ecological community that the ESA's
focus on species instead of habitat protection limited the law's
effectiveness. 23 Yet Congress was also reacting to political developments
taking place on the ground. Private lands on California's San Bruno
Mountain targeted for development held habitat for ESA-protected
butterflies.24 After a decade-long fight, several California cities, the Fish and
Wildlife Service, the California Department of Fish and Game, San Mateo
County, landowners, developers, and environmentalists agreed to allow
development of some butterfly habitat while committing the landowners

19. Karin P. Sheldon, Habitat Conservation Planning: Addressing the Achilles Heel of the
EndangeredSpecies Act, 6 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 279,295 (1998) (quoting H.R. REP. No. 97-385, at 29
(1982) (Conf. Rep.)).
20. Id. at 295-96; JUDrH A. LAYZER, THE ENVIRONMENTAL CASE: TRANSLATING VALUES INTO
PoucY 322-23 (2002).
21. Sheldon, supra note 19, at 295-96; LAYZER, supra note 20.
22. Marj Nelson, Habitat Conservation Planning, ENDANGERED SPECIES BULL., Nov./Dec.
1999, at 12-13, availableat http://endangered.fws.gov/esb/99/11-12/12-13.pdf; Sheldon, supra
note 19, at 296 (quoting H.R. REP. No. 97-385, at 29 (1982) (Conf. Rep.)).
23. P.A. Harcombe & P.L. Marks, Species Preservation,194 SCIENCE 383 (1976).
24. Sheldon, supranote 19, at 297-98.
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to preserve and enhance butterfly habitat in other areas. This was an
interesting and innovative deal, but it appeared to be illegal since the
development it allowed would kill listed butterflies and such takes on listed
species were prohibited by the ESA. Section 10 amended the law to allow
deals like this one, and the San Bruno agreement became the first approved
HCP.2 San Bruno seemed to show that collaboration and negotiation could
lead to reasonable resolutions to classic struggles between environmentalists and developers, and Congress moved "to provide the
institutional framework to permit cooperation between the public and
private sectors in the interest of endangered species habitat conservation."26
What sort of cooperation does section 10 anticipate? The only
formal participants in habitat conservation planning required by the law are
landowners and relevant federal agencies.27 Landowners may open the
bargaining process to other groups, such as conservationists or recreation
groups or independent scientists, but this is entirely the choice of the
landowner submitting the plan. A study of participation in habitat
conservation planning that focused on 45 large plans covering more than
1,000 acres found that environmental, tribal, and commodity interests were
involved - at varying levels - in 60 percent of the HCPs, meaning that 40
percent were negotiated with no outside participation.28 Where
participation occurred, it was not often effective -few FWS staff said that

25. TRA Envtl. Scis., Inc., The San Bruno Mountain Habitat Conservation Plan: Preservation of an Ecological Island, http://www.traenviro.com/featuredprojects/sanbruno/
sanbruno.html (last visited Mar. 6, 2007); Press Release, U.S. Dep't of the Interior, Fish &
Wildlife Serv., Nation's First Formal Plan to Save Endangered Species Set for Update (July 22,
2004), availableathttp://sacramento.fws.gov/ea/news releases/2004%20News%2Releases/
SanBrunoHCPUpdateNR.htm (lastvisited Mar. 6,2007); LAYZER, supra note 20, at 322-23.
26. Sheldon, supranote 19, at 298 (quoting H.R. REP. No. 97-385, at 31 (1982) (Conf. Rep.)).
27. JEREMY ANDERSON & STEvEN YAFFEE, BALANCING PuBuc TRUSrAND PRIVATE INTEREST:
PUBLIC PARTICIPATION IN HABITAT CONSERVATION PLANNING, A SUMMARY REPORT 17-18 (1998),
http://www.snre.umich.edu/ecomgt/pubs/hcp.pdf. Anderson and Yaffee note that the ESA,
the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), and many state environmental statutes require
agencies and applicants to provide public notice of their proposed activities and their potential
consequences. With respect to HCPs,
[tlhe (Fish and Wildlife) Service typically notices receipt of an HCP
application in the Federal Register and then conducts a 30 to 45 day comment
period... .The law does not require the FWS to incorporate public comments
into an HCP or make decisions based on public comments... .The law
provides the FWS with significant discretion to shape its own public
participation policy. However, rather than using the law's flexibility to craft
effective public participation the FWS interprets the law narrowly and
focuses on explicit disclosure and comment period requirements. The Service
encourages applicants to pursue the bare minimum in NEPA documentation
and comment period.
Id. at 22.
28. Id. at 17.
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public participation yielded substantive changes to plans, and in more than
one-third of the cases public participation had no apparent effect on the
outcome.29 Independent scientists played an even smaller role in the
development of the HCPs, with active or moderate involvement in 28
percent of the cases. 3° According to Jeremy Anderson and Steven Yaffee,
less than a third of the planning staff surveyed reported submitting
scientific documents to independent scientists for peer review.31
The level of outside involvement in habitat conservation planning
varies considerably, depending on the perceived ability of environmental
groups to create problems for the planners and with the type of
applicant -state and local governments are more likely than are private
landowners to involve outside groups in planning processes.32 Overall, as
exercises in pluralist decision making, HCPs often seem to fall short. A
heavy burden falls on federal agencies with limited budgets and staffing to
represent the public interest in negotiating with private interests over what
are, in effect, business plans. Political science highlights the risk of "agency
capture" inherent in processes like this, and in the case of HCPs,
environmentalists have shared the concern that political pressures on the
FWS to produce plans, coupled with a negotiation process driven by
regulated interests, may subvert the ESA. As will be shown below,
experience provides some basis for these concerns: the results of habitat
conservation planning have been controversial and, from an ecological
perspective, often problematic.
The first 12 years after passage of section 10 saw little action on
HCPs; only 14 plans were approved between 1982 and 1992 and, as of 1994,
only 39 had been approved.33 Most of these plans covered only a few acres
and focused on individual species. 4 Karin Sheldon illuminated the many
reasons behind the dearth of HCPs during this period including the costs
of developing and implementing plans, which fell heavily on landowners;
the high transaction costs involved in negotiating plans; the limited budgets
of stressed federal agencies; and landowners' lack of certainty about
whether the plans would hold in the face of changing conditions, changing
science, or the discovery of new species on their lands.35 Moreover, since
few landowners actually faced legal action under the ESA for illegal
takes-federal agencies face staggering problems in monitoring and
enforcing the prohibition on takes on private lands and lack the budgets

29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 9-11.
Sheldon, supra note 19, at 300.
Id.
Id. at 301-12.
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and political will to aggressively enforce the law -incentives to submit
plans were weak. 6
Yet during the Clinton years, habitat conservation planning moved
to center stage. By 1997 over 400 plans covering approximately 19,000,000
acres of land had been approved or were in process.37 In the Pacific
Northwest, 27 percent of commercial forestland was covered by HCPs, or
was in the process of being covered, and across the country the FWS and
NMFS were encouraging landowners to submit plans.38
Why did the HCP program suddenly take off? From a biological
perspective, the need to focus on habitat protection generally, and on
private lands in particular, was obvious. Ecologists had long thought that
the ESA needed to look beyond species counts to habitat protection, and the
HCPs offered a way of addressing issues of habitat degradation and
fragmentation.39 Further, a 1994 General Accounting Office (GAO) report
asserted that 90 percent of ESA-listed species have some or all of their
habitat on non-federal lands, and that nearly 40 percent were present only
on non-federal lands.40 The ESA would have to reach private lands to
realize its species protection goals. HCPs were a tool for influencing
landowners' choices in ways that would help to fulfill the goals of the ESA.
The political logic was also overwhelming. At one level, the
approach was consistent with Clinton's embrace of a centrist domestic
policy and his commitment to moving beyond a "false choice" between
economic prosperity and environmental protection. 4 Thus, the
administration acknowledged that landowners had legitimate concerns
about the ESA and moved to address those concerns. Assistant Interior
Secretary George Frampton recognized that "[firom a private landowner's
point of view, the Endangered Species Act looks like a nuclear weapon," 42
and the administration pursued a series of initiatives to improve the
efficiency and effectiveness of the law while protecting property owners. It

36.

Id. at 292.

37. NAT'L CTR. FOR ENVTL. DECISION MAKING RESEARCH, UNDERSTANDING AND IMPROVING
HABITAT CONSERVATION PLANS 2-3 (1998), http://www.ncedr.org/pdf/hcp.pdf.

38.
39.
40.

Id.
See generally Harcombe & Marks, supra note 23.
U.S. GEN. ACCOuNTING OFF., GAO/RCED-95-16,

ENDANGERED

SPECIES ACT:

INFORMATION ON SPECIES PROTECTION ON NONFEDERAL LANDS 4-5 (1994).

41. See generally E.J. DIONNE, WHY AMERICANS HATE POLrICS 9-15 (1992) (on the politics
of "false choices").
42.

CLINTON ADMIN. HIST. PROJECT 2000, A HISTORY OF THE U.S. DEPARTMENT OF THE

INTERIOR DURING THE CLINTON ADMINISTRATION, 1993-2001, available at http://library.doi.
gov/master0105.pdf. The quote from Secretary Frampton can be found in William K. Stevens,
Future of Endangered Species Act in Doubt as Law Is Debated, N.Y. TIMES, May 16, 1995, at C4
(internal quotation marks omitted).
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saw section 10 as a way of drawing landowners into species protection
while sheltering them from the ESA gone nuclear.43
Second, Republicans in the 104th Congress seemed determined to
undermine the ESA. In the Senate, Slade Gorton's (R-WA) proposal,
deemed the moderate alternative, would have eliminated the threat of fines
and imprisonment for landowners who destroyed endangered species
habitat and would have dropped the ESA's objective of protecting "the
ecosystems upon which endangered species and threatened species
depend."" However, Interior Secretary Bruce Babbitt claimed that the
Gorton bill would have effectively repealed the ESA.45 On the House side,
conservatives sought to curtail the role of the federal government in species
protection on private lands, relying instead on states, voluntary compliance,
economic incentives, and "conservation through commerce including the
private propagation of animals and plants."' The Clinton administration
found itself squeezed between environmentalists seeking more aggressive
species protections, the obvious need for greater protections for species on
private lands, and ascendant conservatives seeking to gut the ESA. Section
10 offered a chance of escape, and the administration took that chance. John
Kostyack of the National Wildlife Federation observed, "The Clinton
Administration.. .spent six years turning a virtually nonexistent Habitat
Conservation Plan program into a major Endangered Species Act initiative
covering over 11 million acres of land."47
The administration adopted two important rules to encourage
landowners' development of HCPs. First, the "no surprises" rule
guaranteed landowners that once a plan was approved, the government
could not demand changes to the plan in light of new information, new
scientific knowledge, or changes in the condition of a species." (Some plans,
like the Plum Creek HCP discussed below, included specific provisions for
revisiting plans in light of new information, but these were built into the
original agreement signed by the landowner.) "No surprises" gave property
owners certainty about management of their lands for the length of the
agreement, and often the terms were quite long. Of the 132 plans approved

Stevens, supra note 42.
Id. (quoting Gorton proposal) (internal quotation marks omitted).
John H. Cushman, Conservatives Tug at Endangered Species Act, N.Y. TIMES, May 28,
26.
Id.
John Kostyack, The Need for HCP Reform: Five Points of Consensus, 16 ENDANGERED
SPECIES UPDATE 47 (1999), abstract available at http://www.umich.edu/-esupdate/library/
99.5-6/contents.html.
48. Sheldon, supra note 19, at 315; U.S. Dep't of the Interior, Fish & Wildlife Serv., "No
Surprises" Questions and Answers, http://endangered.fws.gov/hcp/NOSURPR.HTM (last
visited Mar. 3, 2007).
43.
44.
45.
1995, at
46.
47.
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in the West, 30 percent were for terms of 50 years or more, and 50 percent
were for terms of 30 years or more -three plans were set for 100 years. 9
Second, the "safe harbor" rule encouraged voluntary efforts by landowners
to manage their lands to support listed species. Landowners receive
assurances that, if listed species move onto their property or grow in
numbers due to their habitat protection or restoration efforts, they will not
face new restrictions on the use of their property.50 Once again, the Clinton
administration acted to increase predictability for property owners in ways
that would encourage them to submit HCPs. Most observers think that the
introduction of the "no surprises" rule played a crucial role in encouraging
landowners to participate in the program.
These rules were controversial. The practical problems confronting
the Clinton administration included pressures from environmentalists, the
apoplectic reactions of property owners to potential restrictions on land use,
and a Congress in which "moderation" had come to be defined as an
effective repeal of the ESA. In a letter to Congress, 150 conservation
scientists criticized the "no surprises" rule for locking in land management
practices for long periods of time, arguing that this "does not reflect
ecological reality and rejects the best scientific judgment of our era.
Moreover, it proposes a world of certainty that does not, has not, and will
never exist."5
"No surprises was, of course, not science policy at all -it was a
political necessity designed to attract landowner participation in HCPs. As
the National Center for Environmental Decision-making Research (NCEDR)
concluded, decision makers in environmental policy rarely use sciencecentered models. 2 They
describe themselves as being in the middle, facing the
challenge of balancing competing interests and incentives,
incorporating multiple perspectives and concerns, and
making inevitable tradeoffs. Indeed they use few of the tools
and little of the information potentially available to them,
partly because they do not think that science provides the
answers to their institutional, political, and practical
problems. 3

49. U.S. Dep't of the Interior, Fish & Wildlife Serv., Habitat Conservation Plans, 2007,
http://ecos.fws.gov/conservplans/index.jsp (last visited Feb. 3, 2007).
50. U.S. Dep't of the Interior, Fish and Wildlife Serv., Endangered Species Program, Safe
Harbor Agreements for Private Landowners (Feb. 2004), http://www.fws.gov/endangered/
recovery/harborqa.pdf.
51. Gregory A. Thomas, WAhere PropertyRights and BiodiversityConverge, PartI: Conservation
Planningat the Regional Scale, 17 ENDANGERED SPECIES UPDATE 139, 141 (2000).
52. NAT'L CTR. FOR ENVTL. DECISION MAKING RESEARCH, supra note 37, at 6.
53. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
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The stakes in the HCP program grew following a crucial Supreme
Court decision in June 1995. In Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapterof Communities
for a Greater Oregon, the Supreme Court upheld the Fish and Wildlife
Service's ruling that the ESA's definition of prohibited "harm" to listed
species includes the modification or destruction of species habitat, even on
private lands.' This removed any ambiguity about the ESA's restrictions on
otherwise lawful private development activities and made it clear that
much of the activity on lands inhabited by listed species was illegal. This led
landowners - particularly large landowners like timber companies - to the
HCP bargaining table.55
A. Plum Creek's Cascades HCP
One such company was Plum Creek Timber, which has major land
holdings in the Pacific Northwest's spotted owl country. Plum Creek had
logged aggressively in the 1980s, creating highly visible clear cuts -some
in patches as large as a square mile-along the 1-90 corridor through
Washington's Cascade Mountains.' A corporate descendant of the
Northern Pacific Railroad, its 170,000 acres along the interstate were
interspersed with 201,000 acres of Forest Service lands and 41,000 acres of
private and state lands in a checkerboard pattern that is the legacy of
legislation signed by Abraham Lincoln.57 The company had a reputation as
a poor environmental steward: one Washington Congressman dubbed
Plum Creek the "Darth Vader" of northwest timber companies."

54. Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Cmtys. for a Greater Or., 515 U.S. 687 (1995); Kevin
D. Batt, Above All, Do No Harm: Sweet Home and Section Nine of the Endangered Species Act, 75
B.U. L. REV. 1177 (1995); Tom Kenworthy, Justices Affirm Wide Power to Protect Wildlife Habitat,
WASH. POST, June 30,1995, at Al.
55. Eric Pryne, Decision May Nudge Landowners into Action, SEATTLE TIMES, June 30,1995,
at B2. For an examination of another major HCP, see Tony Davis, San Diego's Habitat Triage,
HIGH COUNTRY NEWS, Nov. 10, 2003, available at http://www.hcn.org/servlets/hcn.
Article?article_id=14355. Smaller landowners often find HCPs too expensive and complex to
develop.
56. Kathie Durbin, Timber's Bad Boy Comes to the Table, HIGH COUNTRY NEWS, Aug. 4, 1997,
availableat http://www.hcn.org/servets/hcn.PrintableArticle?articleid=3487.
57. Susan Jane M. Brown, David and Goliath: Reformulating the Definition of "The Public
Interest" and the Futureof Land Swaps After the Interstate 90 Land Exchange, 15J. ENvTL. L. & LMG.
235, 252-55 (2000); Durbin, supra note 56; Eric Pryne, The CheckerboardLegacy, SEATrLE TIMES,
Nov. 13, 1994, at Al; Mark Miller, Plum Creek Habitat Conservation Plan (1999),
http://sunsite.utk.edu/ncedr/casestudies/hcp/plum.htm (last visited Oct. 29, 2006); PLUM
CREEK TIMBER CO. & D.R. SYSTErMS, INC., PLUM CREEK TIMBER CO.'S CASCADES HABITAT
CONSERVATION
PLAN,
http://www.for.gov.bc.ca/hfp/silstrat/habitat/hsworkshop/
presentation/4-05/4-05-Reimer.pdf.
58. Durbin, supra note 56.
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The spotted owl listings posed major challenges to Plum Creek,
particularly given the intermingling of its Cascade lands with federal
property. Operating in prime owl habitat, the company found itself
compelled by an ESA section 4(d) rule to avoid takes inside a series of 2,523
acre "owl circles," habitat around nesting sites on and overlapping Plum
Creek lands. 59 Logging was illegal or sharply limited within these 1.8 mile
radius circles, whose locations changed with the identification of new
nesting sites.6s Plum Creek representative Lorin Hicks testified to Congress:
"The listing of the northern spotted owl and subsequent federal 'guidelines'
trapped over 77 percent of Plum Creek's Cascade Region in 108 owl
'circles.' Indeed, with every new listing Plum Creek was skidding closer to
61
becoming the poster child for the taking of private lands."
Plum Creek valued the timber within each circle at $25,200,000 and
claimed it spent $500,000 annually on surveys of owl nesting sites.62 The
status quo was unacceptable to the company, and Darth Vader was ready
to cut a deal with representatives of the republic. "For us," Plum Creek's
Hicks said, "the answer came with Habitat Conservation Plans."'
Discussions of the Plum Creek HCP for the Cascades began in 1994
and took nearly two years to complete, with the company investing two
million dollars developing the plan.' It was signed on June 27, 1996, at a
public ceremony attended by Secretary of the Interior Babbitt and Secretary
of Agriculture Dan Glickman, and was seen as a model for future plans.6
This "multi-species" HCP addressed habitat issues for four listed
species-the northern spotted owl, marbled murrelet, gray wolf, and
grizzly bear -as well as 281 other species on 170,000 acres of Plum Creek
land.66 The company agreed to defer harvests on 2,600 acres of old growth
forest, to leave trees around sensitive habitats, and to increase the size of the
young forests used by owls for forage and dispersal.6 7 Concerned about

59. Id.
60. Id.; Hearingbefore the Subcomm. on Fisheries,Wildlife, and DrinkingWater of the S. Comm.
on Env't & Public Works, 97th Cong. (1999) (statement of Dr. Lorin L. Hicks, Dir. of Fish &
Wildlife Resources, Plum Creek Timber Co.) [hereinafter Hicks statement], available at,
http://www.epw.senate.gov/107th/hic-7-21.htm (last visited Mar. 8, 2007).
61. Hicks statement, supra note 60.
62. Durbin, supra note 56; PLUM CREEK TIMBER Co. & D.R. SYSTEMS INC., supra note 57, at
4.
63. Hicks statement, supra note 60.
64. Durbin, supra note 56.
65. Editorial, Cutting Timber, Protecting Wildlife, SEATrLE POST-INTELLIGENCER, June 27,
1996, at A12.
66. Miller, supra note 57; PLUM CREEK TIMBER CO. & D.R. SYSTEMS, INC., supra note 57, at
3.
67. PLUM CREEK TIMBER Co. & D.R. SYSTEMS, INC., supra note 57, at 3; Durbin, supra note
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salmon habitat, the HCP included the development of a riparian strategy
for the management of 20 watersheds. Plum Creek agreed to two 100-foot
buffers around fish-bearing streams (including a logging ban within 30 feet
and a mandate to leave at least half of the commercially available trees in
the rest of the buffer) and less stringent buffers around year-round streams
not known to be fish bearing.6 The plan also anticipated a land swap
between the Forest Service and Plum Creek.69 In return, the company would
get the right to log heavily in other areas, including the right to reduce the
percentage of its holdings in old growth from 20 percent (the situation in
1996) to eight percent by 2025.70 The plan estimated that the number of
nesting sites for owls would decline as a result of the agreement.' As Plum
Creek biologist Hicks observed, "This is a take mitigation plan, not an owl
recovery plan."72 The HCP was set for 50 years and is renewable for another
50 years. Hicks noted, "If we didn't have the opportunity to re-up, it would
create the perverse incentive to basically provide only what's required and
zero out all extra habitat by the end of the permit period."'
Both the Clinton administration and the company celebrated the
deal. FWS assistant regional director Curt Smitch said, "This is a huge shift
in land management. It's finally managing for an entire ecosystem, which
is what scientists and environmentalists have been asking for all along."74
Babbitt observed that it was the "most innovative and sophisticated" plan
yet developed, calling it
another example of President Clinton living up to his
commitment to make the ESA work better....This Administration has accomplished major strides in making the ESA work
better and more flexibly .... [W]e have implemented a number
of policies that are revolutionizing our capability to work
voluntarily with property owners throughout the country.
The flexibility in the Act, and this Administration's goal to
encourage certainty for landowners through a multi-species
approach to conservation, has allowed companies like Plum
Creek Timber to look at ecosystems and watersheds on their

68. PLUM CREEK TIMBER CO. & D.R. SYSTEMS, INC., supra note 57, at 21.
69. Brown, supra note 57.
70. Durbin, supra note 56.
71. Id.
72. Id. (quoting Hicks).
73. Id. (quoting Hicks).
74. Danny Westneat, Logging That Will Protect Wildlife - Plum Creek Plan Hopes to Do Both,
SEATTLE TIMES, June 26, 1996, at B1 (quoting Smitch).
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land and develop a blueprint for long-term protection that we
can all be proud of.75
Plum Creek representative Hicks testified to the Senate, "For Plum Creek
and other applicants, the HCP process has been the principal catalyst for
private landowners to undertake unprecedented levels of scientific research
and public involvement."76
Law professor Oliver Houck echoed Hicks in noting the impact the
owl listings and the habitat conservation planning process had on Plum
Creek's behavior:
The proof of the Plum Creek plan will be years in the
knowing. The purpose of this analysis is neither to praise nor
to criticize it, but rather to show how far Plum Creek came in
getting to it, literally from the rear of the pack to somewhere
close to the front. Doubtless, the company was motivated by
the beating it was taking in public relations from such
unusual quarters as state governors, members of Congress
and the Wall Street Journal. But when push came to shove, it
was the defined, empirical needs of protected species that
drew the circles, brushed in the corridors and stretched out
the harvest rotations to more nearly mimic a natural forest
environment. "More nearly mimic" will not satisfy everyone;
perhaps it will not even satisfy the basic needs of creatures in
considerable peril. But given the history of Plum Creek, it has
been an incredible journey, and without legally protected
indicator species there is no reason to think that it would ever
have occurred.'
Despite the optimism reflected in these comments, the Plum Creek
deal drew substantial criticism from the environmental and scientific
communities, as well as from some interested in the principle of
collaborative decision making. Critics attacked the no surprises rule, the
perceived weakness of the plan's measures for mitigating the impact of
planned harvests on listed species, the number of "takes" allowed, the gaps
in the science that informed the plan, the central role played by the
company itself in monitoring results, and the peripheral involvement of
environmental groups in the process. Tim Cullinan, an Audubon Society
biologist, observed, "The concern is that the Fish and Wildlife Service is

75. Press Release, U.S. Dep't of the Interior, Secretaries Babbitt and Glickman Sign
Agreements with Plum Creek Timber to Improve Habitat Conservation for Wildlife and Fish
(June 27,1996), http://www.doi.gov/news/archives/pr68m.html (last visited Mar. 8, 2007)
(quoting Babbitt).
76. Hicks statement, supra note 60.
77. Oliver S. Houck, On the Law of Biodiversity and Ecosystem Management, 81 MINN. L. REV.
869, 971 (1997).
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trying so hard to demonstrate the flexibility and adaptability of the ESA that
they're willing to compromise too much."78
Two issues in the Plum Creek debate reverberated beyond the
plan's specifics to a broader critique of HCPs. First, there was the question
of whether the plan was adequately informed by independent science. Plum
Creek's Hicks addressed this matter in testimony to Congress:
Let's dispel the myth that HCPs are not based on science.
When my company, Plum Creek, created its first HCP, we
took on a very complex challenge. Not only did we have 4
listed species in our 170,000 acre Cascade project area, but 281
other vertebrate species, some of which would likely be listed
in the next few years. Combine this with the challenges of
checkerboard ownership.. .and you have a planning challenge
of landscape proportions. To meet this challenge, we
assembled a team of scientists representing company staff,
independent consultants, and academic experts. We authored
13 technical reports covering every scientific aspect from
spotted owl biology to watershed analysis. We sought peer
reviews of 47 outside scientists as well as state and federal
agency inputs. As a result of these inputs, we made technical
and tactical changes to the plan.79
Plum Creek chose to establish the peer review panel voluntarily
and named the panel members. ° Agency representatives were satisfied
with the company's approach, but others complained about the absence of
effective input by independent scientists. 81 One participant at the periphery
of the process argued, "Plum Creek told the public these [documents] were
reviewed from the outside, but really the reviewers were people chosen or
hired by Plum Creek or FWS to review these papers."82 One panel member
said that many suggestions from the reviewers were ignored in the writing
of the HCP. "Any suggestions on major issues were simply not
addressed."8 3
A major 1999 study of a broad sample of habitat conservation plans
found that generally the plans were not well-informed by science.' 4 Peter

78. Rob Taylor, A Timber Plan That's Wrappedin Green, SEATrLE POST INTELLIGENCER, June
25, 1996, at B1 (quoting Cullinan).
79. Hicks statement, supra note 60.
80. Miller, supra note 57.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. PErER KAREIVA ET AL., NArL CTR.FOR ECOLOGICAL ANALYSIS & SYNTHESIS & AM. INST.
OF BIOLOGICALSCI., USINGSCIENCE IN HABirrATCONSERVATION PLANS (1999), http://www.aibs.
org/bookstore/resources/hcp-1999-01-14.pdf [hereinafter AIBS/NCEAS Study].
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Kareiva, the lead investigator on the project, summarized the key findings
in testimony to Congress. He observed that planning takes place in the face
of a dearth of data about "the most basic biological processes pertaining to
endangered species - such as what is the rate of change in their populations
locally? [Niationally? [Wihat is their reproductive schedule? [Wihat is
happening to their habitats in quantitative terms...?" " He asserted that for
many plans the data "are so scant, that the HCPs really should not be called
'science based' since science requires data from which inferences are drawn
and tested."86 Further, he said that few plans include adequate provisions
for monitoring populations affected by habitat modification: "[So ] -called
'adaptive management' may be mentioned in HCPs, but an extremely small
percentage of HCPs actually establish any adaptive management
procedures (complete with statistical power analyses for assessing whether
they are likely to work)."87
These critical findings spilled over onto the Plum Creek plan, since
the Cascades HCP was in the study sample. The study team questioned the
finding that the harvests planned for the Cascades project area would have
minimal impact on owl populations. One member of the study team
asserted that there were "no data available to support this notion." s8 Given
that Secretary Babbitt's approval of the plan was contingent upon this
finding, the study's results raised real questions about the Plum Creek
agreement. The FWS questioned some of the findings of the Kareiva study
but acknowledged that HCPs were a "work in progress" and announced
several initiatives for strengthening the scientific basis of HCPs. 89
The second crucial issue involved participation in conservation
planning. As was noted above, conservation planning involves the
government agency (FWS or NMFS) and the landowner; landowners may
invite other participants into the process at their own discretion. In practice,

85. National Study of HCPs on HabitatConservation Science: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on
Fisheries,Wildlife, and Drinking Water of the S. Comm. on Environment and Public Works (1999)
(statement of Peter Kareiva, Senior Ecologist, Nw. Region of the Nat'l Marine Fisheries Serv.,
Nat'l Oceanic & Atmospheric Admin., U.S. Dep't of Commerce), availableat http://www.ogc.
doc.gov/ogc/legreg/testimon/106f/kareiva0720.htm.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Rob Taylor, State Is "Proving Ground" for Habitat Plan, Babbitt Says, SEATTLE POSTINTELLIGENCER, July 11, 1998, at All (internal quote marks omitted).
89. U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., Response to AIBS/NCEAS's Study, Using Science in Habitat
Conservation Plans (1999), http://endangered.fws.gov/hcp/response.htm. For more recent
assessments of the use of science in HCPs, see Laura Stiffler & Robert McClure, Too Often,
Inadequate Science Hampers Habitat Planning:Suburbs Bearing Down on Cave X, Home to Rare
Spider, SEATTLE POST-INTELLIGENCER, May 4, 2005, at Al; Robert McClure & Laura Stiffler, A
License to Kill: Flaws in Habitat Conservation Plans Threaten the Survival of Scores of Species,
SEATrLE POST-INTELLIGENCER, May 3, 2005, at Al.
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the extent of outside group participation varies, but the most systematic
report on this topic (conducted at the University of Michigan but financed
by the Defenders of Wildlife) argued that too often planning processes do
not include extensive outside participation.' This makes it easier to come
to agreements but, the study suggested, often substantially weakens the
resulting plans in technical and legal-political terms.91
Whether the Plum Creek process was appropriately inclusive is a
matter of some debate. Mark Miller of the NCEDR produced a case study
of the process and identified three "layers" of participants. 92 The primary
actors were the company, FWS, NMFS, and consultants hired by the
company.93 The second layer consisted of the Washington State Departments of Fish and Wildlife and Natural Resources, the Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA), and local tribes.' These participants reviewed the
plan and offered suggestions. The third layer included some environmental
and recreational groups, the Northwest Indian Fisheries Commission, and
the city of Tacoma. 9 The Sierra Club's Checkerboard Project, the
Mountaineers (an outdoor recreationists' group), and the Alpine Lakes
Protection Society were described as the most active of these organizations
in raising criticisms of the plan and offering unofficial reviews of the
National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) reports.96
Unsurprisingly, views about the openness of the process varied
depending upon the "layer" in which participants found themselves.
Company and agency representatives said that they thought that there was
a sound process for integrating the views of outside groups, though some
acknowledged that greater efforts could have been made to reach out to the
tribes.97 Plum Creek took a "proactive" role in informing outside groups
about the plan because the lands in question were popular recreational
areas, but it also sought a streamlined process that would allow it to move
through the planning process quickly. 98 Outside groups complained that
there were few opportunities for meaningful public input.99 One nondecision-making participant in the process observed, "By the time the
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NEPA process was opened up, the public was only rubber stamping the
plan. The deal had already been done."' 0
Anderson and Yaffee found that in the perception of some
participants, Plum Creek offered outsiders many opportunities to
participate early in the process, but that the company was not responsive
later in the process.1 ' Many "outside" stakeholders concluded that their
comments were ignored and their views were not adequately incorporated
into the plan.0 2 Despite a commitment to openness, Anderson and Yaffee
found that "Plum Creek tightly controlled the development of the HCP."'03
Charlie Raines of the Sierra Club said, "as it went farther along, you could
tell they were smiling and being very pleasant, but they weren't changing
the substance. It was sugar krispies: sugar-coated on the outside but no
nutritional value." °4 Yakima Indian Nation representative Jim Matthew
asserted, "It was basically a Plum Creek and FWS show, and whatever
they.. .came up with is what we got."" A Plum Creek representative
acknowledged that groups may be frustrated when participation does not
translate into influence;0 6 an FWS official took a harder line: "'Maybe these
groups always feel like they are under-represented in the process."" 7
As the expansion of the HCP program proceeded, FWS and NMFS
addressed several criticisms of the approach in an addendum to the HCP
Handbook called the "5-point policy." °8 Under this policy, the agencies
would (1) require HCPs to include clear statements of biological goals to
clarify their purposes, (2) push for adaptive management to address
uncertainties about the plan's effects on listed species, (3) provide for more
effective monitoring, (4) clarify the criteria used by the agencies to establish
the duration of plans, and (5) provide more opportunities for public
participation in planning processes."4 These changes were warmly received
by scientists and by much of the environmental community, but as a "work

100. Id. (internal quote marks omitted).
101. ANDERSON & YAFFEE, supra note 27, at 29.
102. Miller, supra note 57.
103. ANDERSON & YAFFEE, supra note 27, at 17.
104. Id. (quoting Raines) (internal quote marks omitted).
105. Id. (quoting Matthews) (internal quote marks omitted).
106. Id. at 18.
107. Miller, supranote 57 (quoting FWS official) (internal quote marks omitted).
108. Notice of Availability of a Final Addendum to the Handbook for Habitat Conservation
Planning and Incidental Take Permitting Process, 65 Fed. Reg. 35241 (June 1, 2000) [hereinafter
Notice]; Envtl. News Network, U.S. Fine-tunes HabitatConservationPlans, CNN, Mar. 10, 1999,
http://www.cnrcom/NATURE/9903/11/habitat.enn/index.html?eref=sitesearch; U.S. DEP'T
OFTHE INTERIOR, FISH & WILDLIFE SERV. & NAT'LOCEANIC & ATMosPHERIc ADMIN., ADDENDUM
TOTHEHCP HANDBOOK: EXECUnvESuMMARY (2000) [hereinafter FWS&NOAA], http://www.
fws.gov/endangered/hcp/executive-sumruary.pdf.
109. FWS & NOAA, supra note 108. See also Notice, supranote 108.
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in progress" it remains to be seen whether the HCP program's scientific
integrity and participatory character can be significantly improved.
B. Conclusion: HCPs: Policy Under Law, Policy Without Law?
HCPs are a core component of the emerging collaborative pathway
in environmental policy making, reflecting many of the larger movement's
strengths. Significantly, the program is grounded in statutory language.
Congress, seeing shortcomings in the 1973 law and the emergence of a
promising experiment in the San Bruno Mountains, enacted section 10.
HCPs promised to solve a range of practical, ecological, and political
problems that appeared intractable under the original language of the ESA.
Effective species protection requires participation by private landowners,
and it is unlikely that property holders are going to accept sharp restraints
on the use of their lands or that the resource-strapped federal government
will compel compliance with the ESA. HCPs address this problem by
offering incentives to landowners to participate in species protection.
Conservation biologists and ecologists have emphasized the need to focus
on problems of habitat degradation and fragmentation as part of the
endangered species program; HCPs have created opportunities for such
ecosystem management.
The Clinton administration's development of the HCP program
seemed to create possibilities for more effective species protection involving
some negotiation and compromise with affected interests. With the "no
surprises" and "safe harbor" policies and an accommodating attitude,
Clinton sought to create a context in which landowners would see the value
of entering into negotiations and ultimately submitting plans to the FWS or
NMFS. Habitat conservation planning might at once address some key
policy problems and salve the bitter controversies surrounding the ESA.
Yet despite its statutory grounding, the program confronts serious
concerns about its legitimacy and effectiveness. The expansion of the HCP
program came in the context of severe budgetary and personnel problems
in the larger ESA program. The FWS and the NMFS could not effectively
process listing petitions, designate critical habitat, or consistently compel
federal "action agencies" to take actions necessary to protect listed species.
Critics argued that rather than simply supplementingother efforts under the
ESA, the HCP program - while itself underfunded - displacedother legally
mandated activities. One of the most vocal critics of HCPs was Kieran
Suckling of the Center for Biological Diversity. Suckling observed,
As these plans become bigger and bigger, they supersede
recovery planning. There are no recovery plans for 70 percent
of all endangered species. The Fish and Wildlife Service says
it has no money to do recovery plans, but it has found money
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to do more than 400 HCPs.... Babbitt has created a shadow
ESA. He's saving the ESA by killing endangered species."1
The language of the ESA is clear, and section 10 did not repeal
requirements for listing species or designating critical habitat. These
opponents have taken their case to the courts as well, challenging the no
surprises rule. Although the rule is technically still intact after years of
litigation, the litigation over the no surprises rule and the related "permit
revocation rule" is still very much alive."1 Yet in spite of the seeming clarity
of the ESA and these legal challenges, the Clinton administration used its
administrative discretion to alter the priorities of the endangered species
program, perhaps to take a broader ecosystem-based focus, but
undoubtedly shifting resources to cutting deals with landowners.
Moreover, there is significant concern about the processes that
produce HCPs, the quality of the science upon which they are based, and
the weakness of monitoring programs. The extent and nature of
participation varies from case to case, depending upon the attitudes of the
property owners and the demands of agency officials. There appears to be
at least some legitimate concern that representation is asymmetric, with
property owners exercising considerable - even disproportionate influence over the planning process. Property rights are obviously
extremely important, but it is necessary to recall that the ESA asserts a
national interest in species preservation; planning processes should reflect
this reality.
Further, as has been shown, studies of HCPs indicate that plans
typically lack solid scientific grounding and that outcomes have not been
aggressively monitored. HCPs represent a major federal commitment -for
example, roughly one-fourth of the land area of the state of Washington is
now managed under HCPs, with more lands to be added to the total
soon - and not only does it appear that many plans were not wellgrounded in science, but it is also difficult to determine whether the plans
are meeting their species protection goals.
Supporters of the program see a healthy flexibility, a new kind of
environmental policy making for a new era. Skeptics see old
politics - government cutting deals with landowners hither and yon, with
little understanding of the consequences of those choices. The new HCP

110. Durbin, supra note 56 (quoting Suckling).
111. Spirit of the Sage Council v. Norton, 294 F. Supp. 2d 67 (D.D.C. 2003); Daniel Cusick,
Court Dismisses FWS Appeal Over "No Surprises," GREENWIRE, May 31, 2005, http://www.
eenews.net/Greenwire/2005/05/31/archive/18.
112. Robert McClure & Lisa Stiffler, A License to Kill: Flaws in HabitatConservation Plans
Threaten the Survival of Scores of Species, SEATrLE POST-INTELLIGENCER, May 3, 2005, available at
http://seattlepi.nwsource.com/specials/licensetokill/.
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Handbook provides more guidance for framing and monitoring the plans,
in essence acknowledging the weaknesses of the program to date. Still, to
date there has been little systematic monitoring of these plans and they are
vulnerable to legal challenge.
One of the core premises of the movement for the new social
regulation in the 1960s and 1970s was that agency capture had been a core
problem for the American regulatory state. Policy would be better and more
democratic if we created processes that would invite interest group conflict
in the legislative process and then in the courts, rather than excluding some
interests in the name of streamlined processes governed by experts and
regulated interests. The conflictual policy environment that resulted
certainly has problems of its own, and there is need for creative thinking
about ways to escape that trap. The HCP framework appears promising,
but it also risks a retreat to decision making involving asymmetric
representation in which property owners drive the process, federal agencies
are under mandates to speed through plans satisfactory to those private
interests, and the public interest in species preservation is weakly
represented.
IV. REINVENTING REGULATION THROUGH NEGOTIATION:
COLLABORATION THROUGH THE NEGOTIATED RULEMAKING
ACT AND CLINTON'S COMMON SENSE INITIATIVE
AND PROJECT XL
The regulatory system that emerged in the late 1960s and early
1970s resulted from changes in values, the emergence of the new public
interest movement reflecting those values, and concerns about the problem
of "agency capture" in the New Deal regulatory regime. 13 Hostility to the
political power of big business melded with the perception that many
agencies were controlled by the industries they were built to regulate,
prompting new thinking about institutional design. As was noted earlier,
Lowi's influential The End of Liberalism argued that the core problem was
excessive, vague delegations of legislative authority to regulatory agencies
and the resulting appropriation of public power by private interests in
policy implementation.114 Broad delegations gave agencies too much
discretion over policy, and too many regulatory agencies used that
discretion to serve organized interests at the expense of the broader public
interest." 5 Lowi decried the ideology underlying these delegations, labeled
it "interest group liberalism," and argued that the New Deal approach to
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regulation obliterated the distinction between private interest and public
authority by handing the tools of government power to private interest
groups.116 The reformers1 of
the late 1960s aimed to set this right with the
"new social regulation." 7
The new social regulation simultaneously attacked agency capture
and the political influence of business corporations. First, Congress wrote8
more specific legislation holding agencies to clear goals and deadlines."
This was particularly important in environmental regulation, where goals
and deadlines were sometimes unrealistic but their impact was profound.
Congress forced the EPA's hand, limiting its "discretion while fostering an9
adversarial relationship between the regulators and the regulated."1
Action-forcing statutes would help to ensure that the agency pursued the
public interest as defined by Congress, mitigating the threat of agency
capture." Second, citizen groups would play a more significant role in rule
making and policy implementation, balancing the influence of business
groups. The courts required agencies to open their decisionmaking
processes to greater participation by public interest groups, while Congress
and the courts made it easier for citizen groups to sue to enforce agency
accountability. 2 ' Reformers built a new regulatory regime reflecting
concerns about the New Deal system and the new balance of forces in
American politics. 122
Before long, however, strong opposition to the new social
regulation emerged. Resurgent business interests attacked environmental
regulations for imposing unnecessary expenses and irrational constraints
on their operations." Academic critics found the system plagued by a
"malaise" marked by inefficiency, excessive costs, delays, and an
entrenched adversarialism that focused debate on procedural questions
rather than problem solving. 2 4
Although reform proposals abound, building a more efficient
system has proven difficult. Congress has achieved some reforms -the
tradable permit system adopted in the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990

116.
117.

118.
119.
120.
121.

Id. at 50-61.
EISNER, supra note 5, at 125-30.
Id. at 128.
Id.
See id.
Id. at 127.

122. RICHARD N.L. ANDREWS, MANAGING THE ENVIRONMENT, MANAGING OURSELVES: A
HISTORY OF AMERICAN ENVIRONMENTAL POLIcY 239-42 (1999); EISNER, supra note 5, at 128-29.
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See generallyMICHAEL PERTSCHUCK, REVOLTAGAINSTREGULATION: THERISE AND PAUSE
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is the key example"2 - but for the most part it has been unable to move
major regulatory reform legislation. In the Clinton years, for example,
environmentalists feared opening the major environmental statutes to
revision and reform because they thought that the Republicans would use
this as an opportunity to weaken protections. After suffering early defeats
on their rollback agenda, Republican leaders in Congress wanted neither to
position themselves as enemies of the environment nor to give Clinton
legislative successes. In the second Bush administration, environmental
issues were a low priority and the administration's agenda centered on
administrative changes while it tried to avoid bloody fights in the Senate.
Despite decades of criticism, pollution regulation is still dominated by the
"lords of a little while ago" -the laws and institutions that grew out of the
public-interest movement of the late 1960s and 1970s.126
Presidents have wrestled with the green state through
administrative centralization, Office of Management and Budget-centered
regulatory clearance, cost-benefit analysis requirements, and bodies like
Vice President Quayle's Council on Competitiveness. 27 This section deals
with a different angle of attack on the green state: experiments to remake
regulation through negotiations with regulated interests and other groups.
The search for more collaborative approaches has been central to the next
generation agenda. Marian Chertow and Daniel Esty observed that the old
system "compartmentalized problems by environmental media" in
complex, rigid, and sometimes internally contradictory statutory and
regulatory structures.128 It created few incentives for exceptional
environmental performance, invited litigation, and "implied a level of
absolutism in pursuit of environmental purity" that prevented rational
tradeoffs between environmental protection and other values.129 Chertow
and Esty called for new "policies that are not confrontational but
cooperative, less fragmented and more comprehensive, not inflexible but
rather capable of being tailored to fit varying circumstances."130 This
perspective has been influential, culminating in the Clinton administration's
1995 National Performance Review document, "Reinventing Environmental
Regulation," which embraced both the conventional critique of command

125. EISNER, supranote 5, at 149-51; RICHARDJ. LAZARUS, THE MAKING OF ENVIRONMENTAL
LAw 200-02 (1998).
126. This borrows from the discussion of the "lords of yesterday" in CHARLES WILKINSON,
CROSSING THE NEXT MERIDIAN: LAND, WATER, AND THE FUTURE OF THE WEST 3-27 (1992).
127. EISNER, supra note 5, at 184-85.
128. THINKING ECOLOGICALLY, supra note 3.
129. Id.
130. Id.
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131
and control regulation and the case for moving beyond adversarialism.
There have been many experiments with environmental partnerships, many
of them aimed at circumventing constraints imposed by golden era statutes.
In these experiments, policy makers seek solutions to particular regulatory
problems and a testing ground for approaches that might underpin a
transformation of the regulatory system.
This section focuses on three such experiments: negotiated
regulation or "reg-neg" and two Clinton-era initiatives, the sector-level
"Common Sense Initiative" and the site-focused "Project XL." It
summarizes these efforts and shows that despite high hopes and occasional
successes in particular cases there is little evidence that they have made
much progress in either tackling narrow regulatory problems or rebuilding
environmental regulation along new lines. We then turn to a broader
analysis of collaborative regulation and the prospects for building a "next
generation" green state somewhere along the pathway marked by these
experiments. Institution-building will be extraordinarily difficult given the
politics of environmental policy in the era of legislative gridlock and the
complexity of the existing green state.132

A. One Step Down the Collaborative Pathway: Negotiated Rule Making
Under conventional "notice-and-comment" rule making, agencies
gather information, draft proposed rules, and then publish those proposed
rules in the Federal Register.133 Agencies may hold informal meetings with
interested groups prior to the publication of the proposed rule, but formal
participation takes place after the draft rule is published.1" Interested
parties then have the right to submit written comments and the agency may
hold public hearings.135 If the agency chooses to go forward with the rule,
it publishes the final version at least 30 days before it becomes effective." 3
The average time for developing rules by the conventional process is
several years, and hostile interests regularly challenge rules in court in

131. PRESIDENT BILL CLINTON & VICE-PRESIDENT AL GORE, REINVENTING ENVIRONMENTAL
REGULATION (1995), http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/npr/library/rsreport/251a.html.
132. See EISNER, supranote 5, at 2-26.
133. For an overview of the rulemaking process, see CORNELIUS M. KERWIN, RULEMAKING
75-86 (1998).
134. Id. at 83-84.
135. Id.
136. Id. at 84-85.
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lengthy proceedings.137 David Pritzker and Deborah Dalton summarize
some key concerns with the conventional approach:
The adversarial nature of the normal rulemaking process
is often criticized as a major contributor to the expense and
delay associated with regulatory proceedings. Agency
rulemaking may be perceived as merely the first round in a
battle that will culminate in a court decision. The need to
establish a formal record as a basis for potential litigation
sharpens the divisions between parties, and may foreclose
any willingness to recognize the legitimate viewpoints of
others.
In these circumstances, parties often take extreme
positions in their written and oral statements. They may
choose to withhold information they view as damaging....
What is lacking is an opportunity for the parties to exchange
views and to focus on finding constructive, creative solutions
to problems.'38
In 1990, building on experiments from the previous two decades,
Congress adopted the Negotiated Rulemaking Act. 1 39 The law's basic
premise is that under certain conditions it may be desirable to bring
interested parties together to negotiate the text of a proposed rule before
that proposed rule is published in the Federal Register.'4 Congress
concluded that traditional rulemaking "may discourage the affected parties
from meeting and communicating with each other," leading to unnecessary
conflict and litigation, and that it "deprives the affected parties and the
public of the benefits of.. .cooperation" as well as the advantages of "shared
information, knowledge, expertise, and technical abilities possessed by the

137. Clare M. Ryan, Regulatory Negotiation: Learning from Experiences at the U.S.
Environmental ProtectionAgency, in MEDIATING ENVIRONMENTAL CONFLIcTS 205-08 (J. Walton
Blackburn & Willa Marie Bruce eds., 1995). See generally Cornelius M. Kerwin & Scott R.
Furlong, Time and Rulemaking: An Empirical Test of the Theory, 2 J. PuB. ADMIN. RES. & THEORY
113 (1992). Some sources assert that 80 percent of EPA rules are litigated, but Cary Coglianese
found that the number is much lower, around 26 percent. Cary Coglianese, Assessing Consensus: The Promise and Performanceof Negotiated Rulemaking, 46 DuKE L.J. 1255, 1296-99 (1997).
138. DAVID M. PRITZKER & DEBORAH S. DALTON, NEGOTIATED RULEMAKING SOURCEBOOK
2-3 (1995) (reference manual prepared for the Admin. Conf. of the United States).
139. Negotiated Rulemaking Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-648, 104 Stat. 4969 (codified at
5 U.S.C. §§ 561-570a (2000)). On negotiations in the 1970s and 1980s, see Coglianese, supranote
137; Daniel J. Fiorino, Regulatory Negotiation as a Policy Process, 48 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 764 (1988)
(reprinted in PRrrZKER & DALTON, supra note 138, at 849-57); Lawrence Susskind & Gerard
McMahon, The Theory and Practiceof Negotiated Rulemaking, 3 YALE J. REG. 133 (1985) (reprinted
in PRITZKER & DALTON, supra note 138, at 704-36).
140. Susskind & McMahon, supra note 139, at 150-51.
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affected parties." 14' All of these problems were exacerbated by the activism
of public interest groups and the openness of the courts to citizen suits - in
essence, negotiated rulemaking (reg-neg) was a response to problems
associated with the new social regulation. Thus, the solution to the problem
of agency capture-a more adversarial, less flexible rulemaking
process - became a problem to be solved by a more cooperative approach in
which interested parties would participate formally in the very earliest
stages of rule making.
Thus, Congress revived an old and controversial premise of
regulatory policy making: "the parties who will be significantly affected by
a rule [would] participate in the development of the rule."142 It hoped that
involving relevant interests early in rulemaking, rather than waiting for the
notice-and-comment period, would speed rulemaking and "increase the
acceptability and improve the substance of rules, making it less likely that
the affected parties will resist enforcement or challenge such rules in
court." 43 However, critics revived concerns about agency capture and
business influence.1 " They worried that flexibility sought by champions of
negotiated rulemaking would "subvert the basic, underlying concepts of
American administrative law -an agency's pursuit of the public interest
through law and reasoned decision-making. In its place, negotiated
rulemaking would establish privately bargained interests as the source of
putative public law." 4 s
How does the formal reg-neg process work?'" The law does not
require agencies to use negotiated regulation, but gives them the option
where it appears the approach might yield good results.147 After
determining whether reg-neg is appropriate for a given problem, the
agency convenes an advisory committee representing the interests affected
most directly by the rule.' 48 Agencies typically seek balanced representation,
though participants frequently report that some relevant group has been

141. Id.
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. See generally William Funk, Bargaining Toward the New Millennium: Regulatory
Negotiationand the Subversion of the Public Interest, 46 DUKE L.J. 1351 (1997).
145. Id. at 1356.
146. There are useful descriptions of the reg-neg process in Coglianese, supra note 137, at
1266-68, and in U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, NegotiatedRulemaking Fact Sheet (2003) [hereinafter
EPA, Fact Sheet], http://www.epa.gov/brownfields/aai/negregfs.htm (last visited Nov. 23,
2004).
147. In some cases, Congress may direct agencies to use reg-neg. For example, in 1992
amendments to the Higher Education Act, Congress directed the Secretary of Education to
submit rules concerning the student loan program to negotiation. USA Group Loan Servs., Inc.
v. Riley, 82 F.3d 708, 714 (7th Cir. 1996).
148. EPA, Fact Sheet, supra note 146.
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excluded. 4 9 Committee meetings are open to the public, though typically
only committee members speak. 5 ° The objective is to develop consensus on
a proposed rule. The agency then uses the consensus agreement as the basis
for a draft rule published in the Federal Register.'5 1 Committees operate
under ground rules negotiated in advance. For example, participants may
agree not to submit negative comments or litigate on points of consensus.5 2
Formally, negotiated rulemaking supplements rather than displaces
conventional rulemaking. Negotiated rules are still subject to conventional
notice-and-comment procedures after the draft rule is published.5 3
The promised benefits of reg-neg go beyond simply improving
rulemaking efficiency and reducing litigation. Advocates see the approach
as a cornerstone of a new regulatory system. Philip Harter, a law professor
and leading advocate for reg-neg, argues that negotiated rules will enjoy
4
greater legitimacy than rules adopted through conventional procedures.15
Negotiating consensus will, he hopes, yield more satisfying, reasonable
decisions reflecting sound data.' Jody Freeman argued that a sustained
commitment to reg-neg could transform the regulatory state by challenging
"the conceptual constraints of the traditional administrative regime,"
thereby encouraging broad participation, problem solving, and the erosion

149. On perceptions that some groups are excluded, see Laura I. Langbein & Cornelius M.
Kerwin, Regulatory Negotiation Versus Conventional Rulemaking: Claims, Counterclaims, and
Empirical Evidence, 10 J. PUB. ADMIN. RES. & THEORY 599-633 (2000). One example of balanced
representation is the reg-neg committee established to develop woodstove emissions
standards, which included representatives from four states and the Natural Resources Defense
Council as well as industry representatives. William H. Funk, When the Smoke Gets in Your Eyes:
Regulatory Negotiation and the Public Interest- EPA's Woodstove Standards, 18 ENVTL. L. 55, 61
(1987); SUSAN L. PODZIBA, FINAL CONVENING ASSESSMENT REPORT ON THE FEASIBILITY OF A
NEGOTIATED RULEMAKING PROCESS TO DEVELOP THE ALL APPROPRIATE INQUIRY STANDARD
UNDER THE SMALL BUSINESS LIABILITY RELIEF AND BROWNFIELDS REVITALIZATION ACr (2002)
(report prepared for the U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency).
150. EPA, Fact Sheet, supra note 146.
151. Id.
152. Id. See, e.g., NATL PARK SERV., FIRE ISLAND NATIONAL SEASHORE: NEGOTIATED
RULEMAKING ADVISORY COMMITTEE FOR OFF-ROAD DRIVING REGULATIONS GROUNDRULES,
(2002), http://www.fiyrra.com/fiyrra/negreggroundrules.html. In this reg-neg, focused on
off-road vehicle use at Fire Island, consensus was defined as "no dissent by any
representative," with representatives promising not to dissent without "serious reservations."
The National Park Service promised to make the consensus rule the basis for its first notice of
proposed rulemaking; committee members promised not to make negative comments on the
"consensus-based language during the rulemaking and any associated processes." Id.
153. EPA, Fact Sheet, supra note 146.
154. Harter, supranote 124, at 7.
155. Id. at 28-31.
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of the public-private divide.5 6 Bill Clinton shared these hopes, supporting
reg-neg as part of the regulatory reinvention project. The 1993 National
Performance Review endorsed the approach, and Clinton's Executive Order
12,866 directed federal agencies "to explore and, where appropriate, use
consensual mechanisms for developing regulations, including negotiated
rulemaking." 15 7 Clinton also demanded that agencies either identify at least
one rulemaking in which they would use reg-neg or explain to the Office of
Management and Budget why the approach was not feasible for them."
The EPA led the way in reg-neg, using the process more frequently
than any other agency." 9 Between 1983 (when the first serious experiments
took place) and 1996, federal agencies produced 36 final rules linked to regnegs.I6 The EPA issued 12 of those rules; no other agency issued more than
seven.1 6 1 The agency used the approach to tackle some difficult issues
including developing standards for reformulated gasoline under the 1990
Clean Air Act Amendments, residential woodstove emissions, coke oven
emissions, workers' exposure to agricultural pesticides, chemical leaks, and
wood furniture manufacturing. 162Some of these reg-negs seem to have been
successful while others have fallen short, but there has been considerable
controversy over the general effectiveness of negotiated rulemaking.
Some EPA cases reveal reg-neg's potential. For example, the
chemical equipment leaks rulemaking begun in 1989 pushed the policy
debate in creative directions, yielding consensus language that satisfied
environmentalists and the industry's need for phased implementation.'
There, reg-neg produced enforceable standards and participants deemed
the consensus process successful.'" Freeman found that reg-neg developed
a new conceptual approach to the control standard and led to discussions
of greener production processes and information sharing among companies
seeking best practices."~ Further, the negotiations revealed that pollution
control and production goals could be compatible, an understanding that

156. Jody Freeman, CollaborativeGovernance in the Administrative State, 45 UCLA L. REv. 1,
35-36 (1997). See also Jody Freeman & Laura I. Langbein, Regulatory Negotiation and the
Legitimacy Benefit, 9 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 60 (2000).
157. Exec. Order No. 12,866 § 3(a)(2), 58 Fed. Reg. 51,735 (Oct. 4,1993), reprintedas amended
in 5 U.S.C. § 601 n. (2000).
158. Negotiated Rulemaking, Memorandum for Executive Departments and Selected
Agencies [and the] Administrator of the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs, 58 Fed.
Reg. 52,391 (Oct. 7, 1993) (alteration in original).
159. Coglianese, supra note 137, at 1273.
160. Id. at 1274.
161. Id.
162. Id.at 1281.
163. Freeman, supra note 156, at 41-49.
164. Id.at 46.
165. Id. at 44.
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had not been widely shared in the industry before reg-neg.' 66 Negotiated
regulation apparently can yield innovative solutions to vexing policy
problems.
Yet more systematic analyses have raised doubts about the general
effectiveness of negotiated rulemaking. First, reg-negs are rare and are
likely to remain so because (a) the conditions under which the approach is
likely to succeed do not appear very often and (b) negotiations are timeconsuming, straining the resources of all participants. 67 Between 1991 and
1996,24 of the 20,190 final rules issued by federal agencies (one-tenth of one
percent) emerged from reg-negs.'6 In 1996, the peak year for reg-negs, only
seven of the 3,762 rules issued by federal agencies were rooted in formal
regulatory negotiations. 169 It is unlikely, then, that agencies or stakeholders
can sustain a large number of reg-negs on complicated and contentious
issues. Therefore, most rulemaking proceeds using less formal consultations
and standard notice-and-comment procedures. Second, Cary Coglianese
undermined two central claims for the advantages of reg-neg, finding that
it neither reduced the amount of time needed to write rules nor reduced
litigation rates. 17° Indeed, in the subset of cases he studied, it appeared that
negotiated rules were more likely to be litigated than rules generated in the
traditional notice-and-comment process."7 Reg-neg participants tend to be
more satisfied with the process than participants in conventional rule
making, but it is unclear that participant satisfaction is related to the quality
of policy choices. 72 Coglianese's findings have drawn fire, 173 but the softest
version of his conclusion- negotiated rulemaking has not yet delivered on
some of its key promises- seems consistent with the evidence. 74

166. Id. at 47-48.
167. Coglianese, supranote 137, at 1276-77. A 1998 EPA assessment of its reg-neg pilots
(while generally positive) found that negotiated regulation was labor-intensive and placed a
heavy burden on both the agency and participants. Funk, supra note 144, at 1366-67.
168. Coglianese, supra note 137, at 1276.
169. Id. at 1277.
170. Coglianese, supranote 137. There is evidence that environmentalists are less likely to
litigate against negotiated rules than conventional rules, suggesting that reg-neg may
overcome any agency biases toward regulated interests. See Mark Seidenfeld, Empowering
Stakeholders: Limits on Collaborationas the Basisfor Flexible Regulation,41 WM. & MARY L. REV. 411
(2000).
171. Coglianese, supranote 137, at 1286-309.
172. See Cary Coglianese, Is Satisfaction Success? EvaluatingPublic Participationin Regulatory
Rulemaking (John F. Kennedy School of Gov't Faculty Research Working Paper RWP02-038,
2000), http://ksgnotesl.harvard.edu/Research/wpaper.nsf/rwp/RWP02-038/$File/rwp2038_coglianese.pdf; Freeman & Langbein, supra note 156.
173. Philip J.Harter,Assessing the Assessors: The Actual PerformanceofNegotiated Rulemaking,
9 N.Y.U. ENVrL. L.J. 32 (2000).
174. Cary Coglianese, Assessing the Advocacy of Negotiated Rulemaking: A Response to Philip
Harter,9 N.Y.U. ENvTL. L.J. 386 (2001).
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Coglianese's work challenges the faith that we can process around
the basic conflicts that give rise to struggles over environmental policy and
that reg-neg can contain conflict to the negotiating room, preventing it from
spilling over into other venues. Further, negotiated regulation highlights at
least two critical issues for collaborative approaches: the problem of
squaring administrative flexibility with the law and the potential for the
development of a path through the environmental policy labyrinth to
"cleaner, cheaper, smarter" regulation.
B. Negotiated Rulemaking: Policy Against Law?
The new social regulation of the 1960s and 1970s created
inefficiencies and unnecessary conflict, but reformers took the less flexible,
more adversarial course for defensible reasons. In The End of Liberalism,
Lowi decried "policy without law," or ad hoc choices made by
administrative agencies in the absence of clear congressional guidance."
The new collaborative approaches present us with this problem of policy
without law and another difficulty: the possibility of inconsistency between
negotiated agreements and reasonably clear statutory requirements, or in
other words, policy againstlaw. There are at least two questions here. First,
can reg-negs consistently serve the public interest while respecting the
integrity of law? Second, since they are, in part, responses to perceived
flaws in the existing regulatory structure, can collaborative approaches
actually succeed within the constraints of law, absent statutory changes that
would clear the path toward greater flexibility and efficiency? This section
will deal with the first of these questions; the second is treated in light of
experiences with the Clinton reinvention project discussed in the following
section.
Although unrelated to environmental policy, a 1996 court case
concerning negotiated regulation highlighted one key problem of policy
without law. In USA Group Loan Services v. Riley, federal circuit judge
Richard Posner confronted a tension between negotiated rulemaking and
well-established notice and comment procedures in rulemaking. 176 Congress
had ordered the Education Department to use reg-neg to craft new rules
governing the student loan program." v The department did so, but
ultimately refused to use the negotiated rule as the basis for the proposed
rule. 78 A group of loan-servicing companies argued that the department
had violated the Negotiated Rulemaking Act by failing to publish the

175.
176.
177.
178.

Lowi, supranote 15, at 92-126.
USA Group Loan Servs., Inc. v. Riley, 82 F.3d 708,714-15 (7th Cir. 1996).
Id. at 714.
Id.
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rule. 79
Posner rejected the industry claim, concerned that "[t ] he practical
effect...would be to extinguish notice and comment rulemaking in all cases
in which it was preceded by negotiated rulemaking; the comments would
be irrelevant if the agency were already bound by promises" made during
regulatory negotiations. 8 ° Judge Posner attacked the notion that agencies
could be bound to rules shaped in negotiations with interest groups: "The
propriety of such a promise may be questioned. It sounds like an abdication
of regulatory authority to the regulated, the full burgeoning of the interestgroup state, and the final8 confirmation of the 'capture' theory of
administrative regulation."1 1
Although the court upheld the Department of Education's handling
of negotiated rulemaking, upholding requirements for traditional notice
and comment, two problems remain. First, as William Funk wrote, under
reg-neg, "agencies learn that achieving consensus of the parties is the
measure of success ....
Thus, the agencies are likely to see their role not as
serving the public interest, but as generating a consensus among the parties
to a negotiation. Public choice theory is not resisted; it is adopted with a
vengeance." '82 Importantly, there is no tension in the run of cases where the
agency does hold to its commitment to the negotiated language, regardless
of whether in the final analysis that language serves the public interest.
Second, and more practically, uncertainty about an agency's commitment
to use the negotiated language as the basis for a proposed rule will weaken
incentives for industries and interest groups to participate in reg-neg. To the
extent that agencies are bound by the negotiated language, Posner and
Funk's concerns about the influence of organized interests take on greater
weight: agencies may lose the autonomy to serve the public interest
anticipated by the Administrative Procedure Act. To the extent that
agencies arenot boundby the negotiated language, the reg-neg approach will
not attract much interest. Groups will be wary of coming to the table if they
cannot trust the government to hold to consensus commitments. 83
Reg-negs can also break through the boundaries set by
environmental statutes. This often occurs under traditional rulemaking as
well, but the very value of reg-neg lies in its flexibility, which can lead to
consensus deals that are "better than the law" from the perspective of the
parties. For example, Funk's study of the EPA's 1987 woodstove regulations
showed that the reg-neg produced consensus rules that violated several
terms of the Clean Air Act.'" Negotiators were aware of at least some of
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181.
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these problems but agreed to work around them where they found
agreement within the group. 185 Thus, consensus rather than statutory
language became the legitinizing standard for the woodstove rules. This is
not to say that the negotiated rules were not credible. They promised to
improve air quality, and arguably the reg-neg process worked better than
conventional rulemaking. Yet the parties' agreement on what worked for
them overrode statutory limits. Whatever legitimacy these rules might gain
through negotiation is lost to the extent that they set policy against law.
Importantly, there was no legal challenge to the woodstove rules because
all of the parties to the agreement had agreed not to sue, and outsiders
lacked the resources to challenge the decisions.M Funk was justified in
worrying that "the incentives to make negotiated rulemaking
succeed.. .undermine and subvert the principles underlying traditional
administrative law by elevating the importance of consensus among the
parties above the law, the facts, or the public interest." 187 The fact that
traditional administrative law and the environmental statutes have not
always served us well cannot justify simply ignoring those statutes.IM
C. Negotiated Rulemaking: More Efficient Processes, or the Bullet Train
into the Labyrinth?
Edward Weber describes the reformulated gasoline (RFG) rule
adopted in 1991 as a successful application of negotiated regulation. 9 Yet

185. Id. at 89-96.
186. Id. See also Robert Choo, Judicial Review of Negotiated Rulemaking: Should Chevron
Deference Apply?, 52 RUTGERS L. REV. 1069 (2000). The woodstove negotiation is not the only
reg-neg in which participants moved forward despite uncertainty about the legality of their
actions. In the 1991 negotiations over reformulated gasoline standards, participants agreed on
a compliance program that would focus not on gallon-by-gallon emissions but whether, on
average, fuel producers met Clean Air Act standards. EPA officials and some
environmentalists charged that averaging was illegal, and "there was no doubt about the intent
of environmental advocates and states to litigate the averaging provisions if adopted outside
the reg-neg. Yet within the context of the reg-neg, the averagingissue became negotiable." Edward
P. Weber & Ann Khademian, From Agitation to Collaboration: Clearing the Air Through
Negotiation, 57 PUB. ADMIN. REv. 396,403 (1997) (emphasis added).
187. Funk, supranote 144, at 1387.
188. DONALD F. KErrL, REINVENTING GOVERNMENT? APPRAISING THE NATIONAL
PERFORMANCE REVIEW 27-30 (1994).
189. WEBER, PLURALISM, supra note 3, at 120-47. See also SUSAN L. MEYER ET AL.,
IMPLEMENTATION OF THE REFORMULATED GASOLINE PROGRAM (Cong. Res. Serv., CRS Rep. 95850 ENR, 1995), http://www.cnie.org/nle/CRSreports/Air/air-12.cfM; MIGDON SEGAL,
ETHANOL AND CLEAN AIR: THE "REG-NEG" CONTROVERSY AND SUBSEQUENT EVENTS (Cong. Res.
Serv., CRS Rep. 93-614 SPR, 1993), http://ncseonline.org/NLE/CRSreports/Air/air-7.cfm;
Ellen Siegler, Regulatory Negotiations and Other Rulemaking Processes: Strengths and Weaknesses
from an Industry Viewpoint, 46 DUKE L.J. 1429 (1997); Michael Weisskopf, Rare PactReached to
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it is also true that, far from offering a clear path through the environmental
policy labyrinth, even this successful rulemaking faced difficult twists and
turns and dangerous intersections with other policymaking paths. Though
the negotiated agreement held against strong political challenges, even
interests that saw themselves as winners seemed discouraged by the
process.' 90 The RFG fight simultaneously demonstrates some of the
strengths of reg-neg and the difficulties of creating any equilibrium out of
the complex, contentious stuff of contemporary environmental politics.
In the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990, Congress took aim at
urban smog with a reformulated gasoline program. 191 The program
mandated the use of cleaner burning fuels in nine cities with serious air
quality problems and required that the new fuel formula yield (a) no net
increase in nitrous oxide emissions and (b) a 15 percent reduction in the
volatile organic compounds (VOCs) produced by standard gasoline. 192
Congressional debate focused on the definition of clean fuels and led to a
compromise embracing methanol, ethanol, natural gas, and reformulated
gasoline.1 93 Congress gave the EPA the authority to define a clean fuels
model that would meet the smog control goals set by Congress. 94
As Weber noted, this was no minor decision: the oil and auto
industries, midwestern agricultural interests, environmentalists, and state
regulators held huge stakes in EPA's decision.1 9 5 Big oil worried about the
costs of developing and distributing RFG and the impact of new "mixed"
formulas on its share of the gasoline market. The industry faced years of
planning and billions in expenditures to retool facilities. 96 Auto
manufacturers worried that vehicles using RFGs might not meet federal
mileage standards, forcing them to develop new engine designs."9
Agricultural interests and allied legislators saw the possibility for enormous
profits in a rule supporting the use of corn-based ethanol. 98
Environmentalists wanted tough standards,' 99 and state regulators wanted
a clear, enforceable policy on vehicle pollution that would reduce pressures
on them to bring the anti-smog hammer down on stationary, industrial

Fight Smog, WASH. POST, Aug. 16, 1991, at Al.
190. See generally Siegler, supra note 189.
191. For a good overview of the politics of reformulated gasoline in this period, see WEBER,
Pluralism, supra note 3, at 120-42.
192. Id. at 122.
193. Id. at 121-22. See also SEGAL, supra note 189.
194. WEBER, PLURALISM, supra note 3; SEGAL, supra note 189.
195. WEBER, PLURALISM, supra note 3, at 122-23.
196. Id.; MEYER Er AL., supra note 189.
197. WEBER, PLURALISM, supra note 3, at 122; MEYER ET AL., supra note 189.
198. WEBER, PLURALISM, supra note 3, at 123; MEYER Er AL., supranote 189; Guy Gugliotta,
Prosperity Once Again Strikes White Lightning, WASH. POST, Dec. 2, 1990, at A3.
199. WEBER, PLURALISM, supra note 3, at 123.
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sources of pollution. 20 0 The EPA found itself at the center of what promised
to be a bitter fight.
As a response, the agency turned to negotiated regulation to try to
speed the rulemaking and avoid future litigation. At the outset, the parties
to the reg-neg and the White House agreed to a formal protocol blocking
intervention from the executive branch outside the reg-neg, forbidding
participants from lobbying outside the reg-neg, and committing all parties
to support the consensus agreement by promising not to sue. This
"assurance mechanism" bound the groups, the EPA, and the White House
to honor the results of the negotiations and was crucial in securing the
participation of environmentalists and state regulators in the process.2 1 The
mechanism would ensure that the agreement would stick, giving the
negotiated rule safe passage through the environmental policy labyrinth.
After difficult negotiations, the parties struck an agreement in
August 1991, and in April 1992 the EPA published a proposed rule based
on the consensus language.2 2 As the deal took shape, however, ethanol
interests grew nervous. The typical ethanol-gasoline blend is more volatile
than gasoline itself, meaning that it releases more VOCs into the
atmosphere than normal gasoline. 2 3 In fact, the blend's volatility exceeded
the normal standard set in the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990.201
Section 211(h) of the amendments provided an "ethanol waiver" allowing
the blend to be sold in the "high ozone season" in urban areas, but the law
did not include any waiver for ethanol in setting the requirements for
reformulated gasoline in section 211(k).2 ' The reg-neg agreement did not
specifically include the waiver, either, but it did contain an ambiguous
provision that might be read to allow the ethanol blends. 26 The EPA did not
think that it had legal authority to include an ethanol waiver in the RFG
program, however, and the industry was hit hard when the proposed rule
did not contain that waiver.2 7
Over the howls of the other parties to the agreement, ethanol broke
its promise not to lobby outside the reg-neg and raced to Congress and the
White House for help.2' The industry secured a non-binding "sense of the
Senate" amendment to an appropriation bill that called the proposed rule

200. Id. at 123-24.
201. Id. at 130-31.
202. SEGAL, supra note 189.
203. Id.
204. Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-549, 104 Stat. 2399 (codified in
scattered sections of 29 U.S.C. & 42 U.S.C.).
205. SEGAL, supra note 189.
206. Id.
207. Id.
208. Id.; WEBER, PLURALISM, supra note 3, at 135-37.
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illegal.2 9 It appealed to the White House, and the ethanol waiver became an
issue in the 1992 presidential campaign.21 ° In October 1992, President Bush
announced that he would grant the ethanol waiver, upsetting the reg-neg
and breaking the administration's commitment to the process.2 While EPA
officials argued that Bush's proposed waiver would have to go through
normal rulemaking procedures, 21 2 Clinton simultaneously dismissed the
Bush decision as a campaign ploy and promised the corn growers support
for ethanol in a Clinton presidency (though he did not promise the ethanol
waiver) .213 Neither campaign could easily ignore the pleas of ethanol
interests given the political importance of the corn-growing states.
So the conflict over RFG quickly spread beyond the confines of the
negotiating room. In late 1993, the Clinton administration reversed Bush's
decision on the ethanol waiver and published a final rule in keeping with
the original negotiated agreement. 2 4' But along with that decision the
administration announced a program to appease ethanol interests that
threatened the reg-neg: the EPA adopted a rule requiring that at least 30
percent of the gasoline sold in cities with the worst air quality contain
additives from renewable sources, a boon to ethanol. 215 Oil industry groups
2 16
challenged the 30-percent rule in the courts and succeeded in blocking it.
Importantly, the oil industry did not charge that EPA's sop to ethanol had
violated the reg-neg. 2 7 Rather, industry attorneys convinced their clients
that the reg-neg was an "unenforceable 'gentlemen's agreement"' rather
than a legal contract, despite the parties' commitments to the prenegotiation protocols. 218 Ethanol was dealt a blow and the oil industry won
an important victory.219

SEGAL, supra note 189.
210. Id.; Charles Babcock, Bush's Sidestep on Ethanol Is Fueling Dispute, WASH. POST, Sept.
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Yet the actions of the White House and the EPA raised questions
about the reg-neg process as a whole, even for the winners. American
Petroleum Institute (API) attorney Ellen Siegler wrote,
[O]ne of the most important benefits API sought in the fuels
reg-neg was a degree of certainty that the informal agreement
would be implemented without major changes sufficient to
allow API members to plan to meet Clean Air Act fuels
requirements until at least the year 2000. At the conclusion of
the reg-neg, API believed it had achieved this objective. The
events that occurred after the completion of the reg-neg - the
NOx reduction requirements and the ethanol mandate,
including the ensuing litigation over the ethanol mandate and
the petition for reconsideration regarding the NOx requirement- taught API that this benefit can be taken away by an
agency for political or other reasons .... The experience of the
fuels reg-neg, in short, left API with the view that the costs of
a reg neg can far outweigh its benefits and that the federal
government can too easily find ways to walk away from a
deal. 2
In this area, reg-neg delivered on some of its promises. Under
difficult circumstances, participants developed a workable solution, on
time, that satisfied most of the parties. The agreement held against powerful
political pressures as two presidential administrations and important
legislators sought ways to appease ethanol. Yet the case also highlights the
limitations on reg-neg procedures and the difficulties of establishing a
policy equilibrium in this field. After ethanol and the Bush administration
broke the agreement to support the negotiated consensus, the Clinton
administration tried to find a middle ground but also ended up appeasing
ethanol with policies inconsistent with the reg-neg. This dispute and several
others landed in the courts, an outcome reg-neg is designed to avoid. 22' The
agreement held, but the collapse of the pre-negotiation protocols raised
doubts about the approach, as evidenced by the comments from the oil
industry attorney quoted above. These deals are embedded in swirling,
contentious politics marked by many venues in which they might be
undone; the politics of RFG could not be contained by the reg-neg.
And of course ethanol politics rolled on, with the industry probing
various points of access to the policymaking process and seeking to attach

220. Id. at 1435-36.
221. Cary Coglianese noted, "[I]n terms of avoiding litigation and reducing conflict, the
reformulated gasoline rule has turned out to be anything but successful." Coglianese, supra
note 137, at 1290. Groups representing the oil industry, the automobile industry, the renewable
fuels industry, and the tank truck industry challenged the rule in court, and the American
Petroleum Institute attacked the rule administratively. Id. at 1290-92.
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its ambitions for corn-based fuel additives to the tax code, farm bills, and
other legislation. m The RFG program was challenged on environmental and
public health grounds, in part because the oil industry's additive, a
petroleum-based product called Methyl tertiary-butyl ether (MTBE), has been
linked to cancer as it has seeped into local water supplies.2m Interestingly,
Agriculture Secretary Dan Glickman spoke at the press conference at which
EPA Administrator Carol Browner announced a plan to ban MTBE and
increase the use of corn-based additives in its place, a proposal that drew
criticism from oil interests and environmentalists skeptical about the
environmental benefits of ethanol. 24 California banned the use of MTBE in
1994 and fought hard for an exemption from the use of ethanol.' 2 Meanwhile,
in mid-2001 Bush administration officials raised the possibility of abandoning
the oxygenated fuels program mandated by the Clean Air Act Amendments
of 1990 altogether. 26 The Energy Policy Act of 2005 achieved this goal,
abandoning the requirement that reformulated gasoline have two percent
oxygen content by weight, and embracing a "renewable fuel standard"
requiring increasing production of fuel from renewable sources between 2006
and 2012, and mandating that fuel from renewables grow at a rate equal to or
greater than gasoline production after 2012.2"
D. Down the "Alternative Path" to Common Sense and Project XL
As was noted above, the Clinton administration endorsed
negotiated rulemaking but also forged beyond it, seeking to develop models
of a more collaborative, flexible regulatory system.' Unlike reg-neg,
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though, the Clinton reinvention efforts were not legitimized by statutes, yet
the Clinton EPA sought to reconstruct regulatory policy making anyway.
Seeking ways around the existing regulatory structure, reinvention efforts
moved a long way down the collaborative path, beyond areas of the map
charted by the Congress.
The Common Sense Initiative (CSI), launched in 1994, and Project
XL (for Excellence in Leadership), launched in 1995, were major elements
of the reinvention program. CSI, described by EPA Administrator Carol
Browner as "probably the biggest new direction in environmental
protection since the founding of the EPA," embraced a sector-level
approach to regulatory negotiation and improvement. 229 Project XL, called
"one of the most ambitious and potentially consequential U.S. experiments
seeking common ground in environmental policymaking," focused largely
on controlling emissions at the level of individual plants."
CSI promised "cleaner, cheaper, smarter" regulation and legislative
proposals for improving environmental policy making. 23 CSI would
enhance environmental protection and lower compliance costs by
addressing problems industry-by-industry rather than by focusing on
individual pollutants. 2 The EPA created a CSI Council and six industrial
subcommittees: auto manufacturing, computers and electronics, iron and
steel, metal finishing, oil refining, and printing. 3 These committees were
asked to seek ways to improve environmental protection while reducing
compliance costs, develop projects on pollution prevention, streamline
permitting and reporting requirements, encourage superior performance
and the development of new technologies, and ensure enforcement of
chronic violators. 3 Browner said that CSI would "take environmental
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protection beyond the command-and-control, pollutant-by-pollutant
approach...[by] developing more integrated, comprehensive strategies for
protecting our air, our water, and our land."235 In assessing CSI, Browner
claimed that it "promoted unprecedented levels of cooperation among
stakeholders, those most affected by environmental decisions....In this
manner, we avoided the old adversarial approach that produced gridlock
in the past." 236
Unfortunately, independent assessments show that CSI had little
success. A 1997 GAO report noted that in three years the project generated
only three formal recommendations to the EPA, none of them major.23 7 The
report criticized the EPA for focusing on CSI's apparent success in
generating activities like stakeholder meetings while giving little attention
to its ineffectiveness in generating substantive improvements to
regulation." Some of the subcommittees were more successful than others,
but CSI participants interviewed for one program assessment reported that
they "gradually came to believe that the Initiative would not be the vehicle
for gaining far-reaching change to EPA's rules and regulations."239 For
example, Coglianese and Allen concluded that "the tangible results (of CSI)
have been quite modest," noting that only five of roughly 30 subcommittee
recommendations had led to changes to EPA rules.24 ° Few of the projects
produced much in the way of substantive policy change or environmental
improvements; most led to the generation of some informational and
educational materials.24 Although CSI was eventually terminated, some
projects continued under different auspices and the George W. Bush EPA
has pursued a "Sector Strategies Program" that bears some resemblance to
CSI.242 The sector-level approach to negotiating regulations is sensible and
it is hard to imagine that the idea will ever be completely abandoned. Yet
CSI's problems offer a cautionary note.
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Like CSI, Project XL, rooted in the Aspen Institute's discussion of
the "alternative path,"24 3 was also ambitious. Administrator Browner said
that XL would be "where we will find the next generation of environmental
improvement, the next generation of environmental technology." 2' The
project promised flexibility, a better fit between regulatory demands and
the needs of specific firms, and ongoing communication between regulated
firms, regulators, and members of the public interested in clean plant
operations.245 Movement down the collaborative path had finally rolled past
the negotiation of general rules and sector-specific plans to the gates of
individual firms, where government officials, business representatives,
environmentalists, and others might find common ground on "cleaner,
cheaper, smarter" rules for governing plant-level operations.
Project XL encouraged site-specific pollution control projects as
alternatives to existing command-and-control requirements. 24 For example,
if a new approach promised to deliver superior environmental
performance, the EPA would waive constraining regulatory requirements.247 Companies would submit proposals for projects to the EPA, which
would evaluate them using several criteria, including the promise of
superior environmental performance, cost savings and efficiency gains, the
level of support from parties with stakes in the project, the existence of
progress measures, the promise that the program would test new ideas that
might eventually inform other EPA programs, and effects on workplace
safety and environmental justice. 2" Proposals would identify stakeholders,
and the EPA could comment on the list and even reject a proposal if the list
was inadequate, but it was up to the regulated firm to keep interested
parties involved in negotiations. The final project agreement would reflect
a consensus of the stakeholders.249 Bush EPA Administrator Christine Todd
Whitman, who would oversee the end of XL, described it as a model of how
regulators should work by building partnerships with stakeholders,
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focusing on results, and moving away from conventional command and
control approaches to more cooperative partnerships. 5
Project XL had some success, achieving about 40 final project
agreements with firms and state pollution control agencies.m" The idea that
businesses should be free to seek the most effective means of achieving
environmental standards set by regulators remains powerful, and few
would challenge the notion that it is important to bore down to the level of
individual plants to achieve flexible, smart rules. Yet, like the experience
with CSI, the overall performance of the program disappointed most
observers and many participants. 2 Environmentalists complained that they
were marginalized in technical debates. Businesses complained about the
vague standard for the "superior environmental performance" they would
have to deliver in return for regulatory flexibility, and both firms and state
agencies chafed against the EPA's caution about stretching existing statutes
and rules. 3 The program suffered from a mismatch between the initial
promise and what EPA leaders thought they could deliver. Clinton's open
invitation to businesses to apply for exemptions from regulatory
requirements generated requests for broad waivers and big changes to
policy. The EPA balked because it lacked clear legal authority to make these
changes, and negotiations dragged on.' Despite the EPA's efforts to
improve Project XL while it was in progress and the creation of an Office of
Reinvention to oversee XL and other reform initiatives, the project
continued to disappoint. 5 On average, agreements took more than 20
months to negotiate, environmentalists decried XL projects as industrydriven, and businesses thought the whole process too slow and saw the
EPA as unnecessarily rigid. 6
What common problems plagued these collaborative experiments?
First, there was the problem of "policy against law." Both CSI and XL were
plagued by uncertainty about whether the EPA had the authority to grant
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the waivers of statutory and regulatory requirements anticipated by the
programs.1 7 The regulatory reform initiatives were undertaken in part
because Congress had been unable to fix many problems in the regulatory
system due to gridlock. Yet the progress of those initiatives was limited by
the very gridlock that motivated them. Alfred Marcus and colleagues
studied the failure of an XL project at the Hutchinson, Minnesota 3M facility
and found that uncertainty about the legality of the project contributed to
its collapse.' They wrote,
[A] troubling issue was whether Project XL-Minnesota could
be carried out without violating existing environmental laws
and requirements. The project by no means was operating
with a clean slate, because it had to contend with the massive
structure of environmental laws and regulations created since
the birth of the EPA in 1970. If the statutory foundation for
the pilot was insufficient, how could EPA proceed? The
agency's view was that there was not much leeway in the
Without additional legal authority, it was unclear if the
law ....
It was
agency could make the changes that XL required ....
unclear, for instance, if EPA had the authority to grant 3M
facility-wide air pollutant emissions standards, waiver of
individual emissions source permitting requirements, and
reduced reporting of compliance. In comparison with
congressional enactments, the Clinton-Gore declaration of XL
policy did not have the legal standing to permit exceptions to
the law. 2 9
As Charles Caldart and Nicholas Ashford observed, "A
fundamental problem with Project XL is that it envisions a kind of
regulatory flexibility that has not been authorized by Congress."2 " The lack
of congressional approval led the EPA to behave cautiously and
firms-fearing being sued by citizen groups-to approach the expensive
process of negotiating a consensus warily.261 The EPA expected hundreds
of applications from firms to participate in the program from which it
would select 55 for experiments. By the end of 1996, the EPA had received
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only 45 proposals, in part because it was unclear
to businesses what the
262
purchase would be given statutory constraints.
The same questions plagued the Common Sense Initiative, which
focused on overcoming a fundamental problem in the structure of the
American green state, its media-specific focus, through sector-level
deliberation.26 Unfortunately, the major environmental statutes limit the
EPA's discretion to waive, trade, and bargain across media. 2" However
rational, well intended, and justified the effort, it is difficult to turn
environmental policy making into the "grand bazaar.261 There were sharp
limits to what the EPA could achieve through this program because the
very statutes it was designed to amend through consensus bargaining cast
a long shadow over those negotiations. 2' A September 1996 industry report
on the reinvention program stated, "there is no short cut, no way around
the difficult task of trying to legislate a better system."267 Yet, the legislative
pathway appears to be blocked. In the 1990s, Republican legislators had
little interest in giving Clinton a legislative victory on environmental
questions, and environmental advocates were terrified of opening up the
environmental laws to greater flexibility in the conservative climate of the
104th and 105th congresses. Experiments like this appeared to be the only
path to a better system for policy makers.
These reinvention experiments were also hampered by the commitment to consensus.2 68 There are good reasons to pursue consensus. If
environmentalists and community representatives participate, consensus
decision rules may mitigate concerns that collaborative processes will be
dominated by industry. Further, consensus can serve as an alternative
source of legitimacy for decisions that may be at odds with the existing legal
framework. Given the vulnerability of these deals to litigation, getting
agreement from the interested parties is, if it can be achieved, quite sensible.
The consensus approach is also appealing on its face, squaring nicely with
the assumption that environmental protection goals are consensual and that
modern policy making needs to focus on sensible means for achieving ends
that we all agree upon. Finally, consensus processes may yield narrower yet
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important benefits: better informed policy, less litigation, and improved
compliance.
Yet gaining consensds is cumbersome, and there is little evidence
that consensus rules reduce conflict and litigation or yield superior policy
choices.269 In fact, Coglianese and Allen have found that consensus
approaches create new issues around which conflict can occur (Who will
participate? What does the agreement we struck mean? Does the policy
eventually adopted reflect the agreement?), that they do not reduce
litigation, and that consensus-based decision making does not necessarily
lead to better choices.2 70 In fact, he argues, consensus groups tend to focus
on areas where there is widespread agreement, giving less energy and
attention to more contentious (and perhaps more important) questions.271
Thus, he found that most CSI projects produced research and education
projects, shying away from more difficult issues that would provoke
conflicts of value and interest.272 Environmentalists' complaints about their
lack of influence in a Project XL project at an Intel facility in Arizona
provoked the following outburst from the company's government affairs
director: "People have misconstrued what the stakeholder process is all
going to make decisions.. .that are binding on Fortune
about. Citizens are
27
500 companies?"
This comment reflects an important issue at stake in these
consensus efforts and the larger collaborative enterprise of which they are
a part. The collaboration project forces agency officials, firms, and citizen
groups to seek the boundaries of public authority on a case-by-case basis.
Where should the line be drawn between public authority and private
choices? Can the objections of citizen groups force Fortune 500 companies
to modify their production processes? Can the EPA waive requirements
here to achieve some compensating benefit there? Once collaborative efforts
get past agreements to produce educational materials and confront harder
choices, participants must tackle fundamental questions about the scope of
public authority at individual plants, in particular regions, or for specific
economic sectors. Widespread agreement that we can do better than the
existing system will not help participants mark the boundaries of public
authority case-by-case, time and again, as these collaborations spread across

269. Id.
270. Id. at 3; Cary Coglianese, Is Satisfaction Success? Evaluating Public Participationin
Regulatory Policymaking, in THE PROMISE AND PERFORMANCE OF ENVIRONMENTAL CONFLICT
RESOLUTION 69 (Rosemary O'Leary & Lisa B. Bingham eds., 2003).
271. Coglianese, supranote 270, at 12-13.
272. Id.
273. Cindy Skrzycki, Critics See aPlaygroundforPollutersin EPA's XL Plan, WASH. POST, Jan.
24, 1997, at D1. See also John H. Cushman, EPA and Arizona Factory Agree on Innovative
Regulatory Plan, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 20,1996, at A18.
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the environmental policy landscape. They are unlikely to prove to be a
solution to adversarialism, but instead the source of a different kind of
adversarialism - perhaps more manageable, perhaps not - in this field.
E. Reconstructing Environmental Regulation
The failings of these reinvention efforts have not curbed enthusiasm
for reform, with advocates seeking lessons that might improve the next
generation of next generation ideas. 274 The reform process will be
incremental, marked by setbacks and learning that might, advocates hope,
inform the development of a new regulatory pathway. Some key conditions
for significant changes in the basic structure of regulatory policy seem to be
in place. We have seen economic change generate new pressures on U.S.
firms; demands from businesses, academics, environmentalists, and others
for more efficient and effective policies; and growing interest in new policy
tools (e.g., economic incentives) and new administrative doctrines
emphasizing collaboration and "command and covenant" thinking. 275 These
have produced some major policy changes (e.g., the Clean Air Act
Amendments' SO 2 emissions trading system) and a raft of experiments in
rulemaking.276
Yet despite decades of criticism and rising pressures for reform, the
basic structures of the green state created in the 1970s to deal with pollution
problems remain firmly in place. Pollution control is a basic commitment
of the American state embedded in legislation, the institutional structure
and organizational commitments of the EPA, and public expectations
expressed by environmental groups. The regulatory reforms anticipated by
next generation reformers amount to efforts at institutional reconstruction,
confronting all of the difficulties involved in a reconstructive project. 27 It is
not surprising that the collaborative experiments we have seen thus far
appear to have made only limited headway against the "tenacious organization of power" that emerged out of the golden era of environmental
legislation.278

274. For example, even while showing Project XL's problems in Minnesota, Marcus and
colleagues conclude that these experiments should continue as "opportunities for learning"
how to improve regulatory policy making. See generally MARCUS ET AL., supra note 230, at
179-96.
275. E. Donald Elliot, Toward Ecological Law and Policy, in THINKING ECOLOGICALLY, supra
note 3, at 170, 183-85.
276. Id. at 170-86; EIsNER, supra note 5, at 4-10; Robert Stavins & Bradley Whitehead,
Market-BasedEnvironmental Policies, in THINKING ECOLOGICALLY, supra note 3, at 105.
277. See generally STEPHEN SKOWRONEK, BUILDING A NEW AMERICAN STATE (1982).
278. Id. at 9.
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First and foremost, the laws set basic limits on the changes that can
be achieved in environmental policy, and, despite all of the apparent
problems with the statutes, they have proven difficult to change.279 The
movement toward collaboration is driven by frustration with the
inflexibility of existing statutes and rules, but progress down this path is
hampered by uncertainty about the amount of flexibility that negotiators
have to bend rules and bargain across media. The familiar critiques of topdown, command-and-control regulation, and the media-specific focus of the
EPA lock in on flaws at the very core of the green state, embedded in its
statutes. Some important changes can be achieved at the margins, but it will
be difficult to address the basic inefficiencies of the green state, and the
fundamental criticisms of scholars and practitioners, without new laws.
And again, given the current configuration of political forces and the
structure of American political institutions, statutory change is at best
unlikely.
Arguably, experiments like CSI and Project XL can set the stage for
new legislation, just as early reg-negs cleared the way for the Negotiated
Rulemaking Act. Yet the political context has changed considerably since
1990, and the focus of CSI and XL on substantive policy changes (rather
than amendments to the rulemaking process subject to correction through
normal administrative procedures) makes building on the Clinton
experiments more difficult. Even if we can assume a receptive political
environment, there is still a Catch-22 here. Most of these experiments have
made limited progress, in part because of uncertainty about the legality of
the bargains to which environmentalists, firms, and the EPA can agree. This
lack of progress, and the accompanying frustration surrounding the
projects, weakens the case that experiments like Project XL and CSI can
serve as models for a new approach to regulation and undermines the
argument that they are harbingers of new laws and new cultures of
regulation. We cannot change the statutes because we cannot demonstrate
the full benefits of flexibility, and we cannot show the benefits of flexibility
because we cannot change the statutes. At some point it will be necessary
to build the new ideology of collaboration and consensus into the laws.
Again, given the current structure of political forces, the prospects of this
seem dim at best.
Furthermore, the failure to embed these projects in statutes leaves
them vulnerable to election results, interfering with the process of
institutionalization. Participants in debates over environmental policy are
aware that Republican and Democratic administrations will carry different
priorities. Firms and environmental groups involved in negotiations over

279. Hirsch, supra note 244, at 129, 131-35; Mank, supra note 261, at 42-43; Steinzor, supra
note 8, at 178.
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regulations have to look beyond the discussions at hand in hopes that the
voters will deliver them a friendlier EPA and White House next time
around. Why accept a deal now when the EPA might be amenable to one
that you would like much better one or two years hence? Can we trust the
EPA to hold to this commitment, given that it may soon have different
political masters? Beyond this, political instability will slow the process of
cultural change at the EPA. It will be difficult to keep up the pressures
necessary to move the agency to embrace more flexible, collaborative
processes to the extent that the commitment to collaboration (and different
types of collaboration) depends on which party controls the White House.
Institutionalizing flexibility will be extraordinarily difficult in any
case. In an early assessment of the Clinton reinvention project, Donald Kettl
observed that the effort lacked an integrating force, any "glue" that might
organize dozens of ongoing projects and hundreds of decisions being made
across the government into a force for lasting change. 2 ° Too many "large
mandates supported by mushy thinking.. .fueled the sense of adhocracy.. .a
sense.. .only increased by the frenzy of accompanying reform."" s How will
policy makers translate "a sense of adhocracy" into a coherent reform
program? And how will the lawmaking process lay the foundation for a
new and flexible green state? Terry Moe showed how interests struggling
over the structure of the laws and agencies that would implement the new
social regulation fought hard over the amount of flexibility the agencies
would have, the role that courts and groups would play in overseeing
implementation of those laws, and the impact of executive authority on
regulatory policy making.2 2 Moe showed that the outcomes were perverse,
with victorious advocates of strong regulation favoring rigid rules that tied
down "their" agencies because they feared that their opponents would
someday regain the political advantage, and the "losers" seeking maximum
flexibility, anticipating the day when they would be in a dominant position
again.2 As policy makers turn to serious efforts to institutionalize
flexibility, the difficulties of the "politics of bureaucratic structure" will
surely reemerge. 2'
Advocates of the next generation of environmental policy making
note that their agenda rests on a "firm foundation," a strong public
consensus favoring pollution control and the conservation of public lands.2"'
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Id.
Id.
See Daniel C. Esty & Marian R. Chertow, Thinking Ecologically: An Introduction, in

THINKING ECOLOGICALLY, supra note 3, at 1, 1-13.

NATURAL RESOURCES JOURNAL

[Vol. 47

This is an important point, yet this public consensus is a weak reed upon
which to rest ambitions to "reconfigure and reinvigorate the environmental
policy debate in America." 6 This classic "permissive consensus" in public
opinion predicts little about environmental politics or policy except that few
politicians will risk proclaiming that they are anti-green. And it certainly
has not prevented growing partisanship on environmental issues. The
commitment to collaboration, if it is to transform the green state, will almost
surely have to drive changes in statutes. Moreover, it will have to confront
old questions about appropriate relationships between public authority and
private interests in policy making.
Reformers in the 1960s and 1970s understood the pathologies of
"interest group liberalism" and attacked the "cozy triangles" that marked
much of regulatory politics. They advanced a new vision of the way that the
boundaries of public authority should be marked and defended. Modem
critics of command-and-control, top-down environmental regulation have
offered persuasive arguments about the inefficiencies of the green state and
the pathologies of command-and-control regulation. Advocates of collaborative approaches confront the challenge of establishing groundsperhaps statutory grounds-for the legitimacy of their vision of a more
flexible, negotiated green state.
V. COLLABORATIVE CONSERVATION: SEEKING COMMON
GROUND ON PUBLIC LANDS MANAGEMENT
In the wake of intensifying conflict over public lands management
in the West-on issues ranging from grazing to logging to recreation to
water to wildlife -collaborative conservation initiatives throughout the
region have risen.287 Collaborative conservation may be defined as efforts
to bring opposing stakeholders together to work toward win-win policy
outcomes. These efforts most typically center on bringing together
commodity interests and environmental groups, though often recreation
interests have a key role as well. Government officials play an ambiguous
role in these collaborative efforts. Although they usually have a seat at the
table, they must be careful due both to their roles as enforcers of federal
laws and federal laws dealing with advisory boards.' Nongovernmental
stakeholders often seek to influence the government officials- in the areas
of timber harvests, grazing, wilderness designation, and the like. These

286. Id.
287. See AcRoss THE GREAT DIVIDE, supra note 3; BRUNNER ET AL., supra note 3; WEBER,
SocIETY, supra note 3.
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efforts seek to integrate economic and environmental goals, and in most
cases primarily involve local participants. That is, the stakeholders are
mainly those who live and work in the area rather than national
environmental groups or corporate executives from headquarters." These
approaches have generated widespread scholarly, media, political, and
foundation interest. 2'0 Given the often informal and ephemeral nature of
these collaborations, no one knows for sure how many groups exist;
estimates range from the hundreds to the thousands.29'
Of course, collaborative conservation has both supporters and
critics. Supporters of collaborative conservation have focused on descriptive
terms such as decentralized, holistic, enhanced government performance,
consensus, active citizen participation, and new governance arrangements.
These supporters often argue that collaborative conservation will not only
improve environmental policy making but will also help to revitalize
democracy and community in these rural areas by involving local citizens
in real governance.292 Critics, including many national environmental
groups, have focused on accountability, authority, expertise, and capture."
These skeptics of collaborative conservation argue that the integrity of
national political authority is at stake.294 Congress has passed a set of
environmental laws that determine how federal public lands must be
managed and allowing local groups - no matter how well-intentioned - to
have a special role in interpreting these laws and managing these lands is
a dangerous precedent.29

289. BRUNNER ET AL., supra note 3, at 7; WEBER, SOCIETY, supra note 3, at 4.
290. Recent significant works include ACROSS THE GREAT DIVIDE, supranote 3; BRUNNER Er
AL., supra note 3; KEITER, supra note 288, at 219-72; TOMAS M. KOONTZ Er AL., COLLABORATIVE
ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT: WHATROLES FOR GOVERNMENT? (2004); WEBER, SOCIETY, supra
note 3; JULIA M. WONDOLLECK & STEVEN L. YAFFEE, MAKNG COLLABORATION WORK: LESSONS
FROM INNOVATION IN NATURAL RESOURCE MANAGEMENT (2000); Cassandra Moseley, New
Ideas, Old Institutions: Environment, Community, and State in the Pacific Northwest (Dec.
1999) (Ph.D. dissertation, Yale University). Leading advocates for and sources of information
on collaborative conservation in the media include High Country News, Northern Lights
Institute and its journal Chronicleof Community, and the Red Lodge Clearinghouse.
291. BRUNNER ET AL., supra note 3, at 36; WEBER, SOCIETY, supra note 3, at xiii, 8.
292. See Philip Brick & Edward Weber, Will Rain Follow the Plow? Unearthing a New
Environmental Movement, in ACROSS THE GREAT DIVIDE, supra note 3, at 15; Philip Brick, Of
Impostors, Optimists,and Kings: Findinga PoliticalNiche for CollaborativeConservation,in ACROSS
THE GREAT DIVIDE, supra note 3, at 172.
293. See, e.g., George Cameron Coggins, Of Californicators,Quislings,and Crazies:Some Perils
of Devolved Collaboration,in ACROSS THE GREAT DIVIDE, supra note 3, at 163.
294. Id. at 169-70; KErrER, supra note 288, at 305-06.
295. Among the variety of names this pathway goes by are collaborative conservation,
community conservation, community-based conservation, cooperative ecosystem
management, grassroots ecosystem management, watershed democracy, and the watershed
movement. See WEBER, SOCIETY, supra note 3, at xiii, 3.

NATURAL RESOURCES JOURNAL

[Vol. 47

There has been a boom in writing on the collaborative conservation
movement. Most of the work has focused on case studies of collaboration
centered on public lands issues in the West. Ronald Brunner and coauthors
argued that community-based initiatives can represent an innovative way
to advance the common interest. 296 This innovation is a response to the
increasing gridlock and citizen disconnect in natural resources policy, a way
around a system in which "participants of all kinds are trapped to a considerable extent in a complex structure of governance that institutionalizes
conflict more than it facilitates the integration or balancing of different
interests into consensus on policies that advance the common interest." 297
Brunner and coauthors examined the state of collaborative conservation by
studying four cases - water management and the Upper Clark Fork Steering
Committee in Montana, wolf recovery in the northern Rockies, bison
management in the greater Yellowstone ecosystem, and timber
management in the Sierra Nevada through the Quincy Library Group
(QLG).2 9' The Upper Clark Fork case represented the clearest success for
collaborative conservation; wolf and bison management could not, in any
sense, be described as successes for collaborative conservation. 299 The QLG,
which has received the most attention of any collaborative conservation
case, receives further discussion below.
Edward Weber produced another significant recent work on
collaborative conservation. He argued that grassroots ecosystems
management (GREM) is an exciting institutional innovation because "[ i n
search of better governance and enhanced accountability to a broader array
of interests, coalitions of the unalike.. .are creating and choosing alternative
institutions for governing public lands and natural resources." 3" Case
studies of the Applegate Partnership in Oregon, the Henry's Fork
Watershed Council in Idaho, and the Willapa Alliance in Washington
confirmed numerous positive on-the-ground results in areas such as habitat
protection, invasive species control, timber harvests, and stream flows, as
well as finding that the groups exhibited a complex and holistic
accountability.3 °1 Why did these groups form? According to Weber,
"Participants in GREM criticize government as inaccessible, biased,
inefficient, and ineffective. The perception is that existing participation
processes are not fair because they are dominated by organized interests
and tend to place too much emphasis on science and expertise and not
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enough on social/community impacts and needs."3 °2 In response, "[a]
number of citizens in the Applegate, Henry's Fork, and Willapa areas
accepted the challenge offered by reconciliation and the idea that if they
could just get the institutions right, they would be better able to discover
the common ground necessary for building and sustaining a new
community."303 Yet, since Weber completed his research, two of his case
study groups have collapsed - the Willapa Alliance disbanded in 2000 after
eight years (due to a drying up of foundation support) and the Applegate
Partnership suspended its meetings two years later (due to the failure of
some participants to follow group norms, making it very difficult to reach
consensus) .34
There is no doubt that collaborative conservation is part of a new
next generation pathway based on negotiation and consensus, but how
significant will it become? Does it represent the future of environmental
politics as its most optimistic boosters claim? What of the numerous failures
and the limited successes thus far? We turn now to an examination of two
collaborative conservation initiatives, the first, the QLG, focused on
achieving a particular policy outcome, and the second, the Quivira
Coalition in New Mexico, focused on altering the process of grazing policy
and management on public and private lands. After examining these two
initiatives, we will return to offer a general analysis of the collaborative
conservation pathway.
A. The Quincy Library Group: New Governance in the Old Labyrinth
Plumas County Supervisor Bill Coates, local environmentalist
Michael Jackson, and Tom Nelson of the timber company Sierra Pacific
founded the Quincy Library Group in December 1992. 30 These individuals
began meeting at the local library to see if they could find any common
ground regarding the management of local national forests, policy that was
currently frustrating environmentalists and the timber industry alike.3 ' The
local environmental group Friends of the Plumas was frustrated with the
3 7
Forest Service's Plumas National Forest plan, adopted in the late 1980s. 0
The group, with allies among the national environmental groups,
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unsuccessfully appealed the plan on water and wildlife grounds.' Local
timber interests were upset because timber sales from northern California
national forests were declining, from 205,000,000 board feet in 1987 to
120,000,000 board feet in 1991, due to environmental group appeals and
lawsuits.309 To the north, the spotted owl was having dramatic effects on
timber harvesting. 31° A related local subspecies, the California spotted owl,
and a potential Endangered Species Act listing cast a shadow over the
northern Sierra Nevada.311 Coates, Jackson, and Nelson sought a way out
of this mess. The QLG developed a Community Stability Proposal for the
management of the Lassen, Plumas, and portions of the Tahoe National
Forests in the summer of 1993.312 The plan proposed some timber
harvesting, with a focus on fire and fuel reduction, as well as watershed
restoration in order to enhance fisheries and watershed health generally.3 13
Logging would avoid roadless areas, riparian areas, and scenic river
corridors.314
To the surprise of QLG, the Forest Service declined to accept the
proposal.31 The local forest supervisor and regional forester were
uncomfortable with the lack of expert participation in developing the
proposal, noting as well the need to work in the framework of existing
procedural laws.316 QLG was not to be denied; it took its case to
Washington, securing a meeting with Forest Service Chief Jack Ward
Thomas and Assistant Secretary of Agriculture Jim Lyons.317 Lyons and the
Clinton administration generally embraced the QLG proposal and
instructed the Forest Service to implement the Community Stability
Proposal.3 18 On the ground, however, the local Forest Service officials did
not embrace the proposal.319 A version of the proposal was included as an
alternative in the environmental impact statement (EIS) of the California

308. Id. at 165.
309. Id. at 166; KErTER, supra note 288, at 275.
310. George Hoberg, The Emerging Triumph of Ecosystem Management: The Transformation
of Federal Forest Policy, in WESTERN PUBUC LANDS AND ENVIRONMENTAL PoLrTIcs 55, 67-70
(Charles Davis ed., 2d ed. 2001) [hereinafter WESTERN PUBLIc LANDS].
311. BRUNNER E AL., supra note 3, at 168; KEITER, supranote 288, at 275-76; Marston, supra
note 306, at 83.
312. BRUNNER ET AL., supra note 3, at 168-69; KEITER, supranote 288, at 276-77; Marston,
supra note 306, at 84.
313. BRUNNER ETAL., supra note 3, at 169; KEITER, supra note 288, at 277; Marston, supra note
306, at 84.
314. BRUNNER ETAL., supra note 3, at 169; KEITER, supranote 288, at 277; Marston, supra note
306, at 84.
315. BRUNNER ET AL., supra note 3, at 170; KEITER, supra note 288, at 278.
316. BRUNNER ET AL., supra note 3, at 170; Marston, supra note 306, at 85.
317. BRUNNER Er AL., supra note 3, at 170-71.
318. Id. at 171.
319. Id. at 172.

Spring 2007]

ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY MAKING

Spotted Owl report,3 2' but this process was sidetracked when the agency
decided to undertake the Sierra Nevada Conservation Framework.321 By
1996, three years after presenting its proposal to the Forest Service, QLG
decided it had had enough of the agency's bureaucratic recalcitrance. 3"
QLG then went to Congress. Local Representative Wally Herger (RCA) shepherded a bill through the House directing the Forest Service to
implement the Community Stability Proposal as a pilot project.3" In July
1997, it passed 429 to 1.324 National environmental groups, however,
opposed the bill; they claimed it violated existing procedures and they
disagreed with the volume and location of the proposed logging.3"
Environmentalist lobbying stalled the bill's movement in the Senate, where
it remained ensnarled in environmental politics for months.326 Even
California's senators were caught up in the morass, with Senator Diane
Feinstein (D) supporting the bill and Senator Barbara Boxer (D) opposing
it.327 The bill eventually passed the Senate as a rider to an omnibus
appropriations bill in October 1998. 32' Despite passage of the HergerFeinstein Quincy Library Group Forest Recovery Act,329 the QLG proposal
became enmeshed in further policy problems. By the time the Forest Service
completed the final EIS related to the Community Stability Proposal, the
agency had to scale back timber cutting to reduce fire risk pursuant to the
Sierra Nevada Conservation Framework, which covered 11 national forests
in the mountain range.3 QLG (as well as other groups) appealed the Forest
Service's decision, arguing that by reducing the amount of timber cutting
allowed, the agency unraveled the collaborative core of the proposal.
However, all appeals were rejected, and the agency began to implement this
variant of the Community Stability Proposal in spring 2000, nearly seven
years after it was developed by QLG.33'
Administrative changes continued, however. The Forest Service
finalized the Sierra Nevada Framework in early 2001, further limiting
harvesting.332 By that time, the patience of QLG members had nearly come
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to an end. Working with the Forest Service was a "process with no end and
no results," according to QLG cofounder Coates." The Bush administration
made additional changes to the Sierra plan, leading the QLG to file a
lawsuit in March 2003 against the Forest Service for failure to implement the
1998 congressional act - not enough timber would be harvested and some
of the proposed cutting would occur in roadless areas and would require
new roads.3" The Forest Service responded by stating that it would
implement the QLG Proposal, leading to a counter-lawsuit by
environmental groups.33 5
While QLG might represent collaborative conservation success in
developing the Community Stability Proposal, once it entered the labyrinth
that is the green state, it met with frustration, and its activities can hardly
be termed collaborative. Its first barrier was the multi-tiered Forest Service
bureaucracy. QLG failed at the local and regional levels but seemed to
achieve success at the national level, gaining the support of the Assistant
Secretary of Agriculture.3 Nevertheless, with Forest Service Chief Thomas
opposed to the QLG proposal, the agency could prevent implementation of
the group's plan by forcing it to conform to a welter of existing laws (most
significantly the Endangered Species Act and the National Environmental
Policy Act),337 the regional Sierra Nevada initiative,3 " and funding
shortfalls -all in the face of a congressional statute.339 On the legislative
track, although its proposal sailed through the House, it quickly became
caught in the congressional gridlock on environmental politics in the
Senate. There, it could only escape through the stealth technique of
appropriations politics. And finally, in the face of Forest Service actions
under the Clinton and Bush administrations, QLG felt it had no alternative
but to turn to the courts.4 ° Once there, it was joined by a number of
mainstream environmental groups challenging the Forest Service's plan
from a different perspective?41 In the end, what began as a new way to
make policy, finding common ground among environmentalists and timber
interests, wound its way through the green state labyrinth for several years
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before emerging at a familiar place in environmental policy - the courts. As
this case demonstrates, it is difficult to escape the green state to achieve
policy goals, even when many parties agree that it is desirable. We now
turn to another type of collaborative conservation, one focused more on
process than particular policy proposals.4 2
B. The Quivira Coalition: Defining the "Radical Center" in Public Lands
Management
The management of grazing on the public lands was of little
concern to environmental groups until the 1970s. Since then, this policy
issue has become one of the most contentious in the environmental arena.
A number of environmental groups have called for an end to public lands
grazing. 3 Some groups have focused on using existing laws (such as the
ESA) and the courts to reduce livestock numbers on public lands.' More
recently, environmentalists have proposed a voluntary program through
which the federal government would buy out ranchers' grazing permits and
permanently retire grazing allotments. 35 Legislation to create such a
program was introduced in the House in 2003.'46 Ranchers, facing declining
economic returns, development pressures in many locations, and
environmental group opposition, have responded strongly-building the
wise use movement and the county supremacy movement, for example, as
well as relying on powerful political connections in western states.347
Several ranchers have refused to recognize federal authority over public
lands, resulting in long-running criminal cases in Arizona, Nevada, and
New Mexico. 3" In response to this increased polarization and high level of
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344. Id.
345. April Reese, The Big Buyout, HIGH COUNTRY NEws, Apr. 4, 2005, at 8-13, availableat
http://www.hcn.org/servlets/hcn.Article?article-id=15398.
346. Press Release, Nat'l Public Lands Grazing Campaign, Shays, Grijalva Introduce
Voluntary Grazing Buyout Bills in Congress (Oct. 20, 2003) (referring to Voluntary Grazing
Permit Buyout Act (H.R. 3324 108th Cong (2003)), available at http://www.
publiclandsranching.org/htmlres/release__billsintroduced.htm (last visited Apr. 20, 2007);
Reese, supranote 345.
347. See generally Charles Davis, Politics and Public Rangeland Policy, in WESTERN PUBLIC
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LANDS?: MINING, FORESTRY, AND GRAzING POLICIES, 1870-1990, at 109-40 (1996).
348. The case in Arizona involved Wally Klump, who was jailed for refusing to remove his
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Ben Colvin and Jack Vogt grazed cattle on a BLM allotment without paying the government,
leading to fines, confiscation of their cattle, and continuing legal battles. Jon Christensen,
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conflict, a number of groups throughout the West have sought to address
these grazing issues through collaborative conservation.
Ranchers and conservationists in a number of locales in the West
sought to come together to a middle ground or what has come to be called
the "radical center." 39 Ranchers feared for their future. As they battled
environmentalists and the bureaucracy on a number of fronts, several
ranchers sought another way. A number of environmentalists sought
another approach as well. Although often successful in court cases, these
environmentalists were not pleased with the health of watersheds even
after cattle were removed. They sought restoration, not just removal, and
they wanted to enlist ranchers to help with this restoration.3" Furthermore,
many environmentalists became increasingly concerned that rural
subdivisions were a far greater threat to the landscape than ranching, and
under the motto "cows not condos" sought ways to connect with the
ranching community.351 In this context, the Quivira Coalition was founded
in 1997 to focus on this radical center, primarily in New Mexico, but spilling
over into Arizona as well. 3 2 Rancher Jim Winder and conservationists
Barbara Johnson and Courtney White founded the influential group. 3 3 Its
original mission statement read:
The purpose of the Quivira Coalition is to teach ranchers,
environmentalists, public land managers, and other members
of the public that ecologically healthy rangeland and
economically robust ranches can be compatible. Our mission
is to define the core issues of the grazing conflict and to
articulate a new position based on common interests and
common sense. We call this new position the New Ranch. It
addresses the ecological and economic needs not only of
ranchers and environmentalists, but also of the nation as a
whole. In a regular newsletter, in lectures, workshops, site

Showdown on the Nevada Range, HIGH CouNTRY NEws, Aug. 27,2001, availableat http://www.
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on national forest land. Tony Davis, The Diamond Bar Saga Goes On - and On, HIGH COUNTRY
NEWS, Mar. 4, 1996, availableat http://www.hcn.org/servlets/hcn. Article?articlejid=1689.
349. An Invitation to the Radical Center, 2003, in FORGING A WEST THAT WORKS: AN
INVITATION TO THE RADICAL CENTER, at vi-viii (Barbara H. Johnson & Quivira Coalition eds.,
2003) [hereinafter FORGING A WEST].
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352. Tony Davis, Rangeland Revival, HIGH COUNTRY NEWS, Sept. 5, 2005, available at
http://www.hcn.org/servets/hcn.Article?articleid=15743.
353. Id.

Spring 2007]

ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY MAKING

tours, and in research, the Quivira Coalition will facilitate the
definition and application of the New Ranch. 5
Winder sought collaboration and new ideas in the face of increasing
economic challenges to his ranching business. 55 White, currently the
executive director of the Quivira Coalition, offered an environmentalist's
perspective on the attractiveness of the radical center. 356 Tired of the
political and legal approach to environmentalism that in his view was
accomplishing little to improve land health, he was attracted to working
with ranchers to improve soil, water, and grass quality. Keys to improving
the health of this land include returning functionality, such as fire,
recognizing grazing as a natural form of ecological disturbance, and active
and widespread monitoring. 35 7 "The principal chore ahead is restoration,"
wrote White. Ranchers could help to achieve this in a way lawsuits could
not.3s
William de Buys, a member of the Quivira Coalition, described the
radical center as:
collaborative and interest-based.. .when we are smart enough
to separate our interests from our political positions, then we
can do some really good work. Then we can have the
flexibility to experiment, to innovate, to make mid-course
corrections, to take on partners we never thought we'd be
working with, and so on.

354. This profile of the Quivira Coalition is based on FORGING A WEST, supra note 349; Our
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TRIB., July 8, 1999, at B1.
356. Courtney White, A New Environmentalism,in FORGINGAWEST, supranote 349, at 53-70.
357. Id. at 62-63, 69.
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The four principal characteristics of the radical center, according to de Buys,
were as follows: " [iut involves a departure from business as usual; it is not
bigoted...; [it] involves a commitment to using a diversity of tools...; [and
it] is experimental."36 ° In early 2003, under the auspices of the Quivira
Coalition, 20 environmentalists, ranchers, and scientists wrote and signed
an "Invitation to Join the Radical Center" in an effort to move the grazing
debate away from lawsuits and political polarity toward a shared middle
ground.3 6' This invitation, addressed to anyone interested, distributed the
Quivira Coalition's message to a larger audience, especially ranchers and
environmental group members who might not be getting an accurate
picture of the grazing debate from the groups to which they belonged.362
Moving from the abstract to the concrete, what is it that the Quivira
Coalition is doing on the ground? The group does not file lawsuits or lobby
for new legislation; rather it advocates for the new ranch method,
restoration, and land health through education, outreach, and demonstration projects. 363 Among the techniques the group uses are outdoor
classrooms, workshops, newsletters, site tours, and books.3M It has also
established a third party monitoring and assessment arm under the name
Cibola Services.365 Among other topics, the Quivira Coalition has focused
its attention on riparian area restoration and management, herding and
holistic management, grass banking, the importance of rangelands
monitoring, defining and marketing conservation values, and biodiversity
Many ranchers who have worked with the Quivira
management.'
Coalition are enthusiastic about the group.367 The greatest outputs from the
Coalition's numerous activities are sharing knowledge, building trust, and,
in a number of locations, improving the health of the land.?
The conscious decision of the Quivira Coalition to avoid lawsuits
and lobbying is an important one. This collaboration of environmentalists
and ranchers is based on a growing but still fragile sense of trust. Many
differences of opinion remain on issues ranging from endangered species
to water management. Having to determine a particular policy position
could severely strain this collaboration. As for lawsuits, the effort to find
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common ground was launched, in many ways, in response to the myriad
lawsuits focused on public lands grazing throughout the West.
Although the Quivira Coalition has had tremendous influence in
New Mexico and beyond, garnering the support of many leading
environmentalists, ranchers, and state and national officials, many other
ranchers and environmentalists have opted not to move to the radical
center. Eric Ness, spokesperson for the New Mexico Farm and Livestock
Association, suggested that the Quivira Coalition was a fine group, but an
unnecessary one.369 "To imply that they're doing a somehow better job than
the regular old day-to-day rancher," he said, "I don't think that's right.
We've been ranching here for 400 years with no problems."37 John
Horning, executive director of the New Mexico environmental group Forest
Guardians, was critical of the Coalition for different reasons.371 "I think the
people at the Quivira Coalition are driven by a cultural imperative to
protect and revitalize ranching and the ranching culture .... I think they have
huge blind spots to the impacts of ranching in the Southwest." 372 Robin
Silver of the Center for Biological Diversity is more blunt: "The best thing
that could happen to the ranchers (in the West) would be that we just shut
them all down. " "
The voices of Ness, Horning, and Silver, especially the latter two,
illuminate the greatest challenge that the Quivira Coalition and other
collaborative conservation groups face. Ranchers like Ness simply may not
participate in the new ranching without some coercion. Theoretically, over
time, Ness and others like him will move in the Quivira Coalition's
direction since it is in their self-interest. This view may very well be true;
many ranchers around the West are adopting more progressive and
sustainable techniques for economic and stewardship reasons. The
problems presented by recalcitrant environmentalists and rigid agencies are
another matter. Dan Dagget, former Quivira Coalition board member, made
exactly this point while describing his frustration when ranchers were
trying to get a new, progressive grazing plan approved for their Forest
Service allotment in Arizona.374 "Finally, with everyone at the end of their
patience," he wrote, "one of the Forest Service people said, 'You don't seem
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to get it. Our decision will be made on the basis of process and process only.
Results are irrelevant to what we're doing here. Our decisions are based on
process because that's what we get sued on.' 37 For all the progress that the
Quivira Coalition has made in building trust and in helping ranchers and
other landowners improve their management, the green state and its
"process" remains. As long as it does, groups like the Center for Biological
Diversity will make use of it to achieve their goals.
C. Can the Radical Center Hold? Collaboration, Public Lands, and the
Green State
Clearly, when we can make policy in an inclusive, collaborative
way that leads to win-win outcomes, we should follow this path.
Collaborative conservation has demonstrated a variety of ways in which onthe-ground results have been achieved in areas like stream restoration and
habitat improvement, accomplished in ways that build trust and lessen
hostility within communities. The organic growth of such initiatives across
the country demonstrates that they are likely here to stay, and that it is
likely that communities and interests will venture down this pathway as far
as they can. The likelihood that collaborative conservation will become a
major new pathway or, as some optimistic next generation boosters
maintain, the new way of making conservation and natural resources policy
is another matter. So far, the successes of groups like the Quivira Coalition
seem to be as far as collaborative conservation can go. The experience of the
QLG is perhaps more indicative of what happens when collaborative efforts
engage larger policy issues. The QLG is seeking significant on-the-ground
policy change, and in a policy arena as diverse as public lands policy,
consensus is highly unlikely. Those groups outside the collaborative process
will turn to alternative pathways to block policy changes they oppose. The
outlines of the QLC story are likely to be repeated across the western
landscape. By seeking voluntary change from willing partners, the Quivira
Coalition presents both a less threatening, but also a less directly significant
policy pathway.376
There are a variety of limitations and problems with the
collaborative conservation pathway. Much of the criticism thus far has
focused on questions of accountability and legitimacy-that is, how are
participants selected? In what sense are they representative of the larger
citizenry? What of the rule of law? Collaborative conservation faces three
other major challenges. First, can collaboration overcome fundamental
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292, at 15-24; Brick, supra note 292, at 172-79.
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value differences? For example, can it work when some parties are opposed
to grizzly bear reintroduction under any circumstances and other parties
have as their primary goal grizzly bear reintroduction? Second, can the
economic sustainability goals of collaborative conservation -even when
agreed upon and implemented -be successful in the face of the increasing
reach of global capitalism? That is, will western agriculture and timber
production be competitive against beef from Argentina and timber from
Chile, even with local support? As land and water values rise, will rural
landowners and communities be able to respond financially? Third, and
perhaps most importantly, can collaborative conservation negotiate a path
through the labyrinth of the green state - the existing laws and institutions
created over the last hundred years?3"
Most advocates of collaborative conservation recognize the
federal - and often state as well - green state. Indeed, it is this green state
and its accompanying gridlock that, in their eyes, necessitated the
innovative approach of collaborative conservation. Donald Snow's
comment is illustrative: "by the mid-1980s most actors in the nation's and
the West's environmental debates came to realize that regardless of their
political positions or the constituencies they represented, positive
advancement of agendas had become stalled."378 Collaborative
conservation, they argued, is used as a way to get around the welter of
laws, regulations, agencies, and national groups that block on-the-ground
progress.379 But supporters come in a variety of stripes; from those who
argue that collaborative conservation is a new way of making policy, one
that is part of "a transformation that rivals the movement's shift from
protest politics in the 1960s to its institutionalization in American politics
in the 1970s and 1980s" 3 to those who make far more modest claims: "[t ] he
future of public lands management is likely to be much more mundane - it
will continue to be characterized by incremental modifications to existing,
national policy regimes, but hopefully with a flexibility and creativity that
can only come from experimentation on the periphery-from local
partnerships. "H8" To be sure, supporters of collaborative conservation also
recognize that the green state helped to create the conditions leading to its
rise; laws such as the Endangered Species Act and the National Forest
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Management Act have given environmental groups leverage to force
commodity interests to discuss altering their ways of doing business. 82
Yet, for collaborative conservation to succeed in a widespread and
significant way, for it to become central to a next generation of
environmental policy, these very components of the green state must be
bypassed. But how to create space and authority for real collaboration in the
face of the existing, often conflicting, institutional orders? Jack Ward
Thomas, Chief of the Forest Service in the mid 1990s, commented that "[t]he
combination of laws passed from 1870 to now is a sort of blob. It doesn't
work, and we try to go around it to get things done."' But Thomas also
made use of that blob to block implementation of the QLG plan, even in the
face of a statute and support by his superiors in Washington. 38, Kent
Connaughton, supervisor of the Lassen National Forest during part of the
QLG debate, is not quite so blunt, but he does make clear reference to the
difficulty of navigating through the green state - for QLG as well as his own
agency: "a welter of laws, regulations, court decisions, and microbudgeting
from Congress that hinder a forest from moving decisively in any one
direction." 38 Another example comes from the Applegate Partnership. One
of the first collaborations, a jointly planned timber sale called Partnership
One, failed because "the ranger district wrote a sloppy environmental
assessment and regional environmentalists successfully appealed the
sale."' Collaborative conservation gets lost in the labyrinth yet again.
Given the gridlock in Congress that protects the fundamental
components of the status quo, it appears unlikely that collaborative
conservation can achieve the significant goals its supporters hold out for it.
As successful as a local collaboration may be, it still must deal with existing
agencies and regulations, laws, and interests. There is nothing to stop the
Center for Biological Diversity from filing a lawsuit under the Endangered
Species Act that unravels a carefully constructed proposal, or from stopping
timber interests from suing an agency for violation of the Federal Advisory
Committee Act. We see collaborative conservation, then, as a new pathway
for conservation and environmental policy. But we do not think it will
become the central component of a next generation of environmental policy
making as long as the existing institutional, legal, and regulatory
environmental order - the green state - is still in place. Simply getting the
institutions right may not sound too difficult, but changing the web of
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environmental laws, regulations, and institutions created over one hundred
years for a variety of aims is a gargantuan enterprise. Creating space for the
successful proliferation of these groups would require nothing less than recreating the green state.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
This article has described movements toward collaboration in
environmental policy making in three areas: endangered species, pollution
regulation, and natural resources management. Each of these three
movements emerged independently, out of concerns about excessive
conflict and policy problems unique to each issue area. The expansion of
habitat conservation planning was motivated by landowner outrage at the
ESA, threats to the law in Congress, and a growing recognition of the
importance of gaining landowners' cooperation in species protection.
Proponents hoped that the ESA could be saved from its critics and that its
effectiveness could be improved through cooperative conservation planning
around private lands. In the context of pollution regulation, concerns about
delay and inefficiency in rulemaking, and the inefficiency of rules
themselves, led Congress to embrace negotiated regulation, which then
allowed for the resulting administrative "reinvention" experiments
involving private interests deeply in the process. Reg-neg advocates hoped
that negotiations would bring more common sense to the process and help
to build a common sense of purpose that would overcome the
confrontational politics so often seen in regulatory policy making. On public
lands, intense conflict over emerging, greener management priorities
generated enthusiasm for collaborative conservation projects involving
locals in shaping those priorities. Proponents hoped that collaborative
conservation could end the wars in the woods and on the range, producing
mutually beneficial management strategies reflecting both economic
realities and good stewardship.
Each of these movements also dealt with a crucial issue in the basic
architecture of environmental policy, the problem of balancing public
authority and private interests, by striking new balances in favor of greater
stakeholder participation. The laws of the 1960s and 1970s were designed,
in part, to avoid the pathologies of agency capture and interest group
liberalism by imposing action-forcing requirements on bureaucracies and
providing for citizen lawsuits to monitor agencies' compliance with the
laws. In all three of these areas, the embrace of collaboration aimed to
alleviate conflicts endemic to "top-down" decision making and to draw
stakeholders together with agency officials for a range of purposes: to open
space for discussion about priorities; to avoid "regulatory unreasonable-
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ness"; 3 to use local knowledge and businesses' understandings of their
own production processes in crafting public policy; and to engage citizens
with diverse interests in building a sustainability ethic.
The dream of collaboration has deep roots in American political
culture, where the ideological attractions of pluralism and traditional
concerns about big government join in the interest group liberal
commitment to self-regulation under the auspices of the state. It also reflects
unique features of the environmental policy arena, where, presumably, the
public consensus that environmental protection and conservation are
important is shared by environmental lobbyists, chemical industry officials,
logging companies, and all of the other participants in stakeholder
bargaining. Within that consensus, and limited by that consensus, new
approaches to environmental policy might emerge out of pluralistic
bargaining.
The goals of collaboration are worthy, and in some cases these
experiments have made impressive gains. But there remain substantial
accountability challenges, pressing questions about who should participate
and how various demands should be weighed by public officials, and
concerns about the legality of some pragmatic, flexible solutions to policy
problems given statutes that impose clear and at times rigid demands on
agency officials and private interests. The collaborative project confronts
basic problems of striking appropriate balances between public authority
and private interests, of ensuring proper representation and weighing
competing demands in bargaining, and of maintaining the integrity of law
in a regulatory regime committed to flexibility and negotiation. Moreover,
it faces these problems in a thick institutional setting in which all of these
problems have been addressed before, with past resolutions embedded in
the practices of political institutions, statutory language, and accompanying
rules. Advocates for the collaborative regime face the challenge of building
new, more cooperative approaches to policy inside institutions that invite
and even force conflict.
Importantly, in each of these cases Congress did act in some way
to open collaborative policymaking pathways, yet in all cases the legislative
action was insufficient to break through the labyrinth. For example, a
federal district court decision in SierraClub v. Babbitt showed that HCPs are
vulnerable to legal claims that the scientific bases of the plans are
inadequate and that the mitigation efforts anticipated by the plans are
insufficient.' The court found no rational basis in the administrative record
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for incidental take permits granted to an Alabama developer to take listed
beach mice, finding that the Interior Department's assessment that
development would have "no significant impact" on mouse populations
had no basis in population inventories, population trend data, or
information on the minimum size of a viable population.8 9 Indeed, the
court concluded, while it was "unclear.. .on what basis the findings of no
significant impact were made,"39 ° it was apparent that the finding was not
made using sound scientific evidence. Given findings that the science
underpinning many of the plans is weak and that there has been little
effective monitoring, there is likely to be legal controversy in this area over
the next few years. Further, section 10 of the ESA did not suspend
requirements that the appropriate federal agencies list species, designate
critical habitat, or develop recovery plans. The HCP project is vulnerable to
the extent that it displaces rather than supplements actions required by the
law.
Negotiated regulation delivered on some of its promises, but the
most systematic studies of its general effectiveness in speeding rulemaking
and heading off litigation indicate that it has fallen far short of its
proponents' hopes.391 Even the reformulated gasoline case, touted with
good reason as an important success, appears to be at best a mixed bag 15
years after the negotiations.392 Movements beyond negotiated regulation to
administrative experiments in collaborative rulemaking at the plant and
sector levels made little progress, constrained by conflicts over the
appropriate levels of participation and influence by various stakeholders
and, of course, the absence of statutory mandates that would clarify for
participants what can and cannot be negotiated at the bargaining table.393
Finally, the Quincy case demonstrated that however well-intentioned,
practical, and mutually satisfying to participants, local collaborative
conservation experiments are, for better and worse, deeply embedded in the
green state's layers of institutions, rules, and processes. The collaborative
conservation movement represents something important and even
admirable in the politics of environmental policy making, but when the
agenda pushed beyond highlighting the value of collaboration for good
stewardship (the Quivira approach) to rewriting forest management plans
and policies (QLG), collaborative conservation as policy making quickly
moved onto difficult and uncertain pathways in the congressional
appropriation process, the administrative process, and the courts. The new,
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collaborative order in environmental politics was quickly drawn into the
conflictual, unpredictable politics of the old order.
Advocates of next generation reforms have looked to these
collaborative initiatives as harbingers of change in the character of
regulation, to be joined with tools like the use of economic incentives to
reconstruct environmental policy. There is evidence that such experiments
can serve as the basis for wide-ranging changes in policy and, ultimately,
new statutes initiating a new regulatory regime. Yet the record thus far
shows that despite the promise of these efforts, the collaborative impulse
faces a "tortuous course"3" through the green state, facing the "tenacious
organization of power"39 embedded in the layers of political development
and the multiple pathways or points of access that exist in the policymaking
system. Furthermore, while critics of top-down regulation have developed
powerful criticisms of traditional approaches to making regulatory policy,
and while they have made a strong case that collaboration can yield both
procedural and substantive improvements, they have not yet shown how
these approaches can successfully address core questions of political
architecture or public philosophy -how can private interests and public
authority be effectively balanced in a bargaining regime?
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